

# Environmental Public Debate:

*In the context of the Arctic in Russian and Norwegian Media*

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**Abstract:** This interdisciplinary and comparative study explores the public environmental debate on the Arctic in the context of Russian and Norwegian media. The aim of the study is to define how the public environmental debate is constructed in the media and is possibly affected by the present resource-oriented policy-making processes regarding the Arctic from the perspective of climate change. Comparing countries with two different political systems and media traditions, this thesis examines how and if public debates contribute to environmentally-oriented policymaking. The novel aspect of this study is that analysis of the public debate is conducted in parallel with the analysis of official debates. The advantage of focusing on two debates simultaneously is that it reveals the contradictions or consistencies of opinions between authorities and the public sphere. The research is based on the analysis of discourses from several Russian and Norwegian media sources from May 2013 to May 2014. The discourse approach represents both a theoretical and methodological framework for analysis. An important part of this study concerns the evolution of historical representations and narratives of the Arctic, which helps to trace modern Arctic narratives and discourses from both countries' historical contexts. Particularly, the environmental aspect of Arctic policies in both countries represents one of the key issues of the debate. With focus on media sources – newspapers articles and radio programs – in both countries I analyze whether the idea of sustainable development is perceived as an efficient and practical alternative to argue against resource depletion and for conservation of the Arctic ecosystem. Particularly, the role of security in the Russian and Norwegian official debates is considered. Taking into account that ethics are an important component of Arctic discourse, this study examines how Russian and Norwegian public debates address this aspect in their rhetoric.

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## List of Abbreviations

AC	Arctic Council
CDA	Critical Discourse Approach
DN	Dagens Næringsliv
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zones
GULag	Soviet System of Forced Labor Camps
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITAR-TASS	Russian News Agency
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NRK	Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation
RAN	Russian Academy of Science
SP	North Pole
SSW	Strong Sustainable Development
UN CLCS	United Nations Commission for Limits of the Continental Shelf
UN CLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WCIOM	Russian Public Opinion Research Center
WSD	Weak Sustainable Development
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature





# 1. Introduction

*...the Arctic is the fastest changing environment on Earth.  
(Berkman 2012:123)*

Since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Arctic ice has diminished considerably, placing the region in the limelight of the global environmental agenda. Global warming affects the vulnerable Arctic environment, threatening endangered species and traditional lifeways of indigenous Arctic peoples. Furthermore, climate change will likely fuel increased economic interest in the region, since the deicing of the Arctic Ocean will facilitate access to offshore oil resources and possibly navigation through the Northern Sea Route. In 2008 the US Geological Survey published a report stating that the Arctic contains 13% of world undiscovered oil and 30% of world undiscovered gas reserves (Brigham 2013:371). Additionally, increased international tensions regarding the right to exploit Arctic resource reserves brings up the issue of security, feeding speculation about the possibility of military conflict between Arctic states. According to Griffiths (2011:6) “the region is coming alive politically under the effects of climate change, resource scarcity, and geostrategic competition.” This study endeavors to explore these aspects of the Arctic debate.

The opening of the Arctic has become a significant international media topic in recent years. My intention is to scrutinize this debate in the context of two countries: Russia and Norway. In the broad sense, this comparative study will map the main perspectives of Arctic discourses in Russian and Norwegian media over the period of May 2013 to May 2014.

Russia and Norway are two of the main claimants attempting to benefit from the opening of the Arctic due to global warming. I chose these countries for my study since Russia and Norway are two of the five Arctic coastal states with resource-

based economies. Such dependence means that resources are vital economic interests, explaining why authorities of both countries confidently follow pro-resource extraction discourses (Jensen 2007). Moreover, the governments of both countries, though they claim to have a high level of commitment to protecting the Arctic's vulnerable ecosystems, continue on with their plans to drill in the region. This tendency is broadly reflected in the official debate present in the media of both countries.

A perspective favoring environmental conservation in the public debate serves as a firm alternative to an economic one. In this respect, Lassi (2013:41) stresses the link between environmental policies and the public sphere. Since the "environmental awakening" began in the 1960s, the public sector became the main initiator of environmentally responsible policy (Lassi 2013, Dryzek 2013). Politicization of this issue, as a result, has led to the emergence of "international environmental politics and environmental security" (Lassi 2013:43).

The public "sphere" (or "space") is an ambivalent notion. Cârstea (2012:125) points out that the general definition regards the public sphere as "any form of association in the name of dialogue and free debate". Jürgen Habermas focused on this phenomenon in his work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962). Fraser (1990:57) points out that in Habermas's sense the public sphere "designates a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk (...) the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction".

Therefore, the public sphere "is conceptually distinct from the official-economy; it is not an arena of market relations but rather one of discursive relations, a theatre for debating and deliberation rather than for buying and selling" (Ibid. 57). However, it is important to stress the modern tendency of "marketization" which affects the media sphere, since commercialization processes and business lobbyism started playing a significant role in policies of modern democratic states (Midttun and

Witoszek 2014). I consider this tendency important while analyzing Russian and Norwegian media sources.

This study is addressed and intended to contribute to discussions amongst political and environmental discourse scholars, as well as researchers of official and public debates, Northern Dimension policy, Russian-Norwegian inter-governmental cooperation and civil society development.

## 1.1 The Aim and Research Questions of the Research

The aim of this thesis is to explore the role of the public environmental debate on the Arctic, namely its construction and capacity to influence current Russian and Norwegian policy-making. This research will identify the similarities and differences between Russian and Norwegian public debates. In order to solve the “research problem” it is important to choose the right sources of information.

Public debate is a broad sphere that includes various sources of information. The task, thus, is to identify and compare the various discursive elements (for example, key story-lines, metaphors, nodal points, etc.) which will allow one to see how the actual public debates in Russia and Norway are constructed. At the same time, comparative analysis demands these sources correlate with each other.

This study examines official and public debates from a broad range of texts from the press, including print, digital and radio forms.<sup>1</sup> Discourse analysis is a combined theoretical and methodological tool for textual analysis (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). In the theoretical part of this study I will draw on the explanation of discourse theory stipulated in Michel Foucault’s philosophy, and use the analytical method proposed by Laclau and Mouffe (2013), with reference to Fairclough’s (1989) critical discourse approach and other discourse methods from

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<sup>1</sup> According to Fairclough, all types of verbal and visual language represent a form of text (Fairclough 1989:27).

various other scholars (Dryzek 2003, 2013; Hajer 1995; Jensen 2007, 2013b; Jensen and Skredsmo 2010; Jensen and Hønneland 2011; Ó Tuathail et al. 2006).

There is a considerable amount of literature on different aspects of the official debate on the Arctic in Russia and Norway, but there has been little written on the public debate. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to study this less-examined dimension. To delimit my study in this very broad topic, I have thus chosen to use a limited number of media sources and a strict timeline. I expect that this study will contribute to partly fill the gap in the literature on the public sphere's environmental perspective on the Arctic. I believe that viewing Russian and Norwegian patterns of public debate on the Arctic will reveal a broader picture of environmental consciousness and behavior in these countries in terms of the capacity to oppose or influence policymaking processes.

The central questions of this interdisciplinary study are the following:

- How has the environmental public debate on the Arctic been constructed in the Russian and Norwegian media from May 2013 to May 2014?
- What impacts have Russian and Norwegian patterns of public debate had on actual environmental policy regarding the Arctic?

In addition, the following secondary research questions are addressed:

- What are the main narratives of the Arctic in Russian and Norwegian historical and cultural traditions that are commonly used in public discussions? What is their importance?
- Who are opinion-makers of the debate and what are the key discursive issues?

- How do the governments of the countries tackle the dilemma of the choice between ecological stability in the Arctic region and using its hydrocarbon deposits for the purpose of national economic policy?
- What role does the issue of security play in the official debate and how is it reflected in the public debate?
- What environmental discourses do the Russian and Norwegian public draw on according to Dryzek's (2013) classification?
- What ethical aspects are addressed in the environmental public debate?
- What is the main source of ethical values in the public debate: historical-cultural background, environmentalist agendas or the official discourse?

Since the theme of Arctic discourse is broad, I detail its background and context in the next sections to help clarify the origin of different perspectives on the Arctic in the present day.

## 1.2 Background for the Study: Arctic Foreign Policy and Fundamental Arctic Policy Documents in Russia and Norway

Greenberg (2009:1316) points out, that “Arctic regional history is a theatre in which international history has played out from its beginning”. The Arctic is important for domestic and foreign policy both in Russia and Norway and several international events have had an impact on the countries' rhetoric on and development policies for their respective northern territories.

The study of the official Russian and Norwegian foreign policy discourse conducted by Jensen and Skredsmo (2010:439) has shown that both countries perceive the Arctic territories as a “future energy province”, while Arctic

resource reserves are of “vital national interest”. Furthermore, the authors point out that within the international arena Russia is portrayed as an assertive nation highly engaged in “competition” over the Arctic. From his first presidential term, Vladimir Putin demonstrated heightened interest in redrawing maritime borders in the Arctic region. According to the *UN Convention on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS, United Nations 1982) Arctic coastal states are prescribed exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the Arctic which stretch 200 nautical miles from their coasts. Moreover, Arctic countries have the right to extend their borders beyond the EEZ through application to the UN Commission for Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). This extension of maritime borders would mean increased economic activity in the resource abundant Arctic waters.

Russia was the first country to submit a claim about the revision of the Arctic maritime borders to the UN CLCS in 2001. The commission responded, stating that the applying country should provide supplementary information and resubmit its application by 2009 (which was later extended to 2015). Norway submitted its claim to the CLCS in 2006, becoming the first country to gain exclusive access to three separate areas in the northeast Atlantic and the Arctic in 2009 (UN CLCS 2009).

Since 2005, discourse on ‘the High North’ (*nordområdene*) has led to broad discursive mobilization in Norway. This period was marked by the document, *The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy*,<sup>2</sup> issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006). The politics of the High North, thus, became an issue widely referred to in the press, leading to the circulation of the story-line, ‘it’s happening in the north’ (Jensen and Hønneland 2011:44). Remarkably, the document led to a shift in focus from the Barents Sea to an area further north, termed ‘the High North’ (Skagestad 2010). The following political purpose is

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<sup>2</sup> Hereafter referred to as *The High North Strategy* (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006)

formulated in the strategy document: “The Government's aim is that Norway will be the best steward of resources in the High North, with oil and gas operations that meet very stringent environmental standards, and with continual knowledge generation, research and development in the petroleum sector” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006:55).

According to Skagestad (2010:15), under ex-Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg’s government (the ‘red-green’ coalition), the High North was designated “as Norway’s most important policy priority in the years to come”. In 2009 a ‘renewed’ strategy, *New Building Blocks in the North* (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009), was presented. However, this document added nothing new to existing policy except concretization of the High North policy direction (Ibid.). In general, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs framed their High North policy with emphasis on cooperation in the sphere of resource management and environmental protection of the Arctic. According to the documents, Russia is presented as a key-actor in Norwegian foreign politics in terms of business and scientific cooperation in the region. Apart from resource and environmental dimensions, the document puts emphasis on the issue of cross-border security.

Peace-oriented Arctic foreign politics, however, have been strained after the Russian expedition to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in August, 2007. During this expedition, led by Arthur Chilingarov, the Russian team planted the national flag on the sea floor of the North Pole. The expedition’s aim was to collect data in support of the Russian claim of an extended continental shelf. According to Wegge (2011:166), “Even though the Russian action had no legal status under international law, it had a great symbolic effect in triggering public response and media attention all over the world”. Dodds (2010:70) points out two reactions among the coastal states: first, it stimulated “further investments in the Arctic-

based activities” and secondly, “it has led the five Arctic coastal states to act more strategically with regard to their collective interests in the region”.

Such an unexpected and assertive acknowledgment of the value of the Arctic’s resource potential by the Russian government forced the need for framing of a national strategy. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the only document on Arctic management was Gazprom’s *Russia’s Energy Strategy Towards 2020* (Gazprom 2003). The development of an official Arctic policy-framing document was announced by president Putin and issued during president Medvedev’s term in 2009. *The Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic up to 2020 and beyond*<sup>3</sup> concluded on a “rather general and cautious” approach to the Russian Arctic (Zysk 2013).

First of all, *The Fundamentals of State Policy* (Russian Government 2009) states the transformation of the Russian Arctic into the main strategic resource base for the national economy by 2020. The document outlines several policy priorities, including environmental protection of the vulnerable Arctic ecosystem – amounting to environmental security – and utilization of the Northern Sea route. The issue of ‘environmental security’ includes several precautions: “conserve and support the protection of the environment in the Arctic, liquidate the environmental consequences of economic activity in the circumstances of increasing economic activity and global climate change” (Svendsen and Bunik 2009:217). This policy document puts strong emphasis on economic resources and national security issues, and it mentions climate change, but without any reference to its anthropogenic nature.

The fact that this document was issued by the Russian Security Council along with the planting of the flag during Chilingarov’s expedition strengthened the

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<sup>3</sup> Hereafter referred to as *The Fundamentals of State Policy*



anxiety about possible military conflict in the region. As a result (and as previously mentioned), geopolitical tension in the Arctic was increasing, but importantly, this information was broadcast to the world by the media. Western media, according to Jensen and Skredsmo (2010:446) has tended “to interpret Russia’s actions in Cold War terms.” The official Russian Security Council’s position, published in Russian media, downplayed this issue: “this does not mean that Russia is trying to militarize the Arctic. We are focusing on the creation of an effective system of coastal security, the development of arctic border infrastructure, and the presence of military units of an adequate strength” (RIA Novosti 2009).

In sum, the Arctic dimension of Russian and Norwegian foreign policy made an impact on the framing of the fundamental development documents and defined official national positions with respect to the issue.

### 1.3 The Political System and Media Models in Russia and Norway

The political system of a country is responsible for shaping the state-media relationship. The Russian political system reveals centralization of power in the President’s hands, whereas the long-term and stable tradition of ‘corporatist’ democracy (further defined below) in Norway provides cooperation of several political actors and the creation of coalitions and consensus-based decision making. Specific models of media systems in both countries form different patterns of public debate and its capacity for opinion mediation.

The ‘superpresidential’ system in Russia, on the other hand, has been described as “towering over government, parliament, and the juridical system while reproducing a ‘monocentric’ system to which all socio-political life is subordinated” (Makarenko 2007 as quoted in Sakwa 2012:3010). ‘United Russia’

(*Edinaya Rossiya*), the majority political party in power since 2003 presents a stronghold for presidential power. Its political performance contributes to the merging of legislative and presidential rhetoric.

Vladimir Putin's, due to his long-lasting presidency made him the most authoritative media opinion-maker. The absence of a democratic media system in Russia results in a lack of freedom of speech, unequal access to alternative media sources, a low degree of pluralism, and media dependence on state. Becker (2004:140) points out that "...the press system under Putin has regressed and [...] Russia has failed to consolidate the nascent democratic media system that began to emerge under former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Russia's first president, Boris Yeltsin". Furthermore, the author refers to the Russian system as a neo-authoritarian type of media:

*Under a neo-authoritarian system, state-owned media have limited autonomy, and appointments to key positions are linked to political loyalty. Access to the media may be open and private ownership may be tolerated, but other mechanisms are used to control messages. Subsidies, targeted tax advantages, government advertising and other forms of assistance are used to promote support. To silence critics, the state does not resort to pre-publication censorship so much as economic pressure through selectively applied legal and quasi-legal actions against owners, as well as broadly worded laws which prescribe criminal and civil penalties for journalists concerning such issues as libel, state interests, national security and the image of the head of state. (Becker 2004:147)*

The Norwegian media system is an example of a democratic corporatist model, according to the classification of media models by Hallin and Mancini (2004). The Norwegian political system belongs to the group of European *welfare state democracies*. The main characteristic of this system is that the role of the state is significant but its power corresponds to a social democracy tradition rather than to an authoritarian one (Rolland 2009:265). As within a liberal democratic model,

media draws on general principles of pluralism, freedom of expression, free access to information, etc. In practical terms this model is different from the liberal one due to the prevailing value of social responsibility over economic profitability: “media are social institutions first, and only second, business enterprises” (Ibid.). The distinguishing trait of this model according to Hallin and Mancini (2004:298) is political parallelism, “a surviving advocacy tradition that sees the media as vehicles for expression of social groups and diverse ideologies”.

The Arctic as a broad issue has gained much attention in Russian and Norwegian media during the last 10 years. After the collapse of the USSR, all the Russian Arctic’s development projects were scrapped because of funding shortages. Discovery of huge offshore resource reserves gave an impulse to develop the northern territories and increase polar research nationally. The strong national interest articulated by Vladimir Putin from the beginning of 2000s is an example of how the Arctic initiative in Russia has always been dependent on the strong leaders’ ambitions.<sup>4</sup> In Putin’s rhetoric the Arctic is used as a tool to justify the ambitions of modern Russia as a strong, rapidly developing country.

Increasing importance of High North politics in Norway led to a discursive mobilization among the population (Jensen 2007). This mobilization happened when “a wide range of actors [...] felt called [upon] to explain their views, although nothing significantly has really happened materially in the North since the debate began” (Jensen and Skredsmo 2010:443). Public opinion makers draw on the environmental aspect of politics in the High North. It has become one of the most important issues addressed by Norwegian political parties during election campaigns. The most recent example is the debate around opening of oil drilling around the nationally significant Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja

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<sup>4</sup> For more examples of leaders’ ambitions, see Chapter 3.

archipelago.<sup>5</sup> This process is closely related to the 2013 parliamentary campaign and is represented as one of its main symbols. Norwegian parties were split about the islands' future, which in turn was reflected in the media.

## 1.4 Sustainable Development as a Turning Point of the Environmental Discourse

The global problem of climate change is the major backdrop overshadowing any question about the Arctic. The most influential idea relating to climate change mitigation is the concept of 'sustainable development,' which became famous after being presented in the report, *Our Common Future* (also known as the *Brundtland Report*, WCED 1987) during the session of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987. Later, in 1992 during the Rio Earth Summit this concept was approved as a principle of the document, *Agenda 21* which outlined sustainable development as a global action. Russia and Norway were among 178 countries which ratified *Agenda 21*. From then onwards, commitment to the doctrine resulted in a number of state decrees and projects developed in both countries. However, during the period between the first two Earth Summits (1992-2002), Russia and Norway seemed to go through the same stages of commitment to the global environmental issues: "the commitment declines progressively in the post-Rio decade and only re-emerges immediately before and after the WSSD in Johannesburg" (Lafferty et al. 2007:186).

This idea of combining the development of socio-economic sectors along with environmental conservation became a popular global initiative raising hopes to prevent the climate change.<sup>6</sup> At the national level, this led to framing of new

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<sup>5</sup> Hereafter referred to as 'Lofoten case'.

<sup>6</sup> For the discussion on the definition of 'sustainable development', see Chapter 2.

policies with respect to the principles of sustainable development. Norway is a strong adherent to the idea of sustainability since the concept was first introduced by its former prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland. Two key documents framing sustainable development policies were issued in Norway: the *National Strategy for Sustainable Development* (2002) and the *National Action Plan for Sustainable Development* (2003). However, Lafferty et al. (2007) point out the irony of how “the land of Brundtland” treats its homemade concept. The authors state that the realization of Norwegian national strategy for sustainable development corresponds to the story-line ‘high ambitions–disjointed follow-up–inconsequential results’ (Ibid. 185).

The official Russian scientific community has been seeking to integrate the idea of sustainable development since 1992 when the transition to sustainable development was announced as a national objective (Presidential Decree 1996). *The Ecological Doctrine* (“Ekologicheskaya Doktrina”), which corresponds to the principles of sustainable development, was embraced at the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency in 2002. However, Russian scholars ascribe the current absence of any effective sustainable development policy to specific socio-economic and political problems in Russia. (Veber 2000:109). Moreover, the prevailing majority of Russians are not aware of this idea (Kozhina 2011, Veber 2000). Later on in Chapter 5, I discuss how the Russian perspective on sustainability (as framed in Presidential Decree of 1996) coincides with Vernadsky’s concept of ‘noosphere’ (‘sphere of reason’)<sup>7</sup> (Oldfield and Shaw 2006).

Another problem is the translation of the essence of ‘sustainable development’ into Russian. Many Russian scholars criticize the variant of the translation,

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<sup>7</sup> Russian, and later Soviet, scientist Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky (1863-1945) developed a model of evolutionary change within which he outlined phases of transformation from a “biosphere” to a “noosphere” (Oldfield and Shaw 2006).

*ustoiichivoe razvitie*, which is commonly used in official Russian documents, meaning ‘stable development’, in a very broad sense. In order to specify the meaning of the concept, Gusejnova suggests the alternative variant “harmonious development of social sphere and nature” (*garmonichnoe socioprirodnoe razvitie*) (as quoted from Kozhina 2011:8). Another example is the variant proposed by Rutkevich (2002:25), “self-sustaining development” (*samopodderzhivajuschee razvitie*).

Nevertheless, what are the obstacles of implementation of a sustainable development framework in the national development strategies of Russia and Norway? On the one hand, the broad understanding of the concept increases the possibility of its interpretation and adaptation for practical implementation. According to Dryzek (2013:235) the great number of definitions of sustainable development can be considered advantageous since it provides constant experimenting with the understanding and explanation of what sustainability is. At the same time, governments are able to experiment with the concept and propose visions fitting within national priorities. Secondly, such an eco-oriented economic approach to solve climate change does not prevent Russia and Norway from putting emphasis on resources as the primary economic base of both countries.

## 1.5 The Origins of Environmental Discourse and Green Politics in the Arctic in Russia

The reforms of the Russian party system starting in 2001 created strong barriers for the registration of political parties and their participation in parliamentary elections. President Putin’s main intention was to reduce the number of parties in order to ensure that the remaining ones would participate actively during elections (Sakwa 2012). It has resulted in the presence of only four political

parties in the Russian Parliament.<sup>8</sup> None of these parties have a clear ecological policy or are eco-oriented because at the time they emerged, the country was facing more urgent socio-economic problems. Neither global environmental degradation nor climate change have been their foci.

The majority party, United Russia (*Yedinaya Rossiya (UR)*), has been in power since 2003. Its political platform still lacks ecological concerns, and it does not even mention climate change. One of their projects is called “Russian Ecology,” and it contains rather general priorities, among which are: environmental protection, energy efficiency, betterment of ecological regulatory and legal frameworks, and creation of an effective ecological economic sector.

Russian parliamentary elections in December 2011 and presidential elections in March 2012 provoked waves of protests arguing for “faithful elections”. In order to respond to the public outcry Putin passed reform measures which eased the formalities of registration of new political parties and their participation in elections. Leaving behind the discussion of the main political outcomes of this reform, I would like to point out that it contributed to the creation of political room for green politics in Russia for the first time.

The Russian Ecological Party, known as “The Greens” (*Rossiyskaya ekologicheskaya partiya, “Zelyonnyye”*), who have existed since 1992 - either in a form of political party or social movement - were revived in 2012. The same year, The Alliance of Greens – The People’s Party (from 2014, the Alliance of Greens and Social Democrats) was created. Both parties refer to the principles of sustainable development in their program documents. However, the Alliance of Greens and Social Democrats claims to be more western-oriented due to

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<sup>8</sup> This term of the present parliament is from 2011 to 2016 and power is shared by the majority party, United Russia (UR), as well as the Communist party (KPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and ‘A Just Russia’ (SR), all of which are the oldest survivors on the unstable Russian political stage.

cooperation with *European Green Party*. The older party, “The Greens” during the time of its existence created several alliances with different Russian political alliances. The present alliance with UR was established in 2012.

Another contributor to green politics in Russia has been made by the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation. It is an organization which aims at building a dialogue between citizens, NGOs, state government bodies and local authorities. In 2009 the Sustainable Development Institute was created under the government of the Civil Chamber of the Russian Federation (*Obsjestvennaja Palata Rossijskoj Federatsii*). The Institute promotes the concept of sustainable development on the social and state levels. Despite the large number of documents created by the working group, the participation of this organization is hardly seen on the level of the public debate. Unfortunately, the Russian political realities contain the risk of being excluded from active political discussions, thus, leaving no space for practical application of the civic initiatives.

## 1.6 Norwegian ‘High North’ Politics

The period of “High North” political discourse in Norway is associated with the “red-green” coalition (September 2005 - October 2013) headed by the ex-prime-minister, Jens Stoltenberg (representative from the Labor Party, or *Arbeiderpartiet* (AP)). Other key figures who have contributed to the High North rhetoric are Jonas Gahr Støre – Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2005 to 2012 – and Ola Borten Moe – Norwegian Minister of Petroleum and Energy from 2011 to 2013. ‘Obsessed’ by the north, these politicians emphasized the primary Norwegian interests in northern Norway and the Arctic: “Petroleum and marine resources in the High North will help provide a foundation for our future prosperity, and we remain determined to preserve the unique Arctic environment” (Støre 2012:19).



The core of the coalition included the Labor Party (AP), the Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk venstreparti* (SV)), and the Center Party (*Senterpartiet* (SP)).

However, its green orientation was conditioned by cooperation with the Center Party (one of the Nordic agrarian parties) which is not the most ecologically-oriented one. The ‘red-green’ government contributed to the discursive mobilization around the Arctic issue with emphasis on energy, security and environmental aspects. In the end of 2013, several months before the new elections, the coalition’s ‘green standings’ were undergoing a test. The key issue of the campaign’s debate was “to open, or not to open”, the sea area around Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja islands for the petroleum industry.

This issue was actively discussed in the media. The participants of the parliamentary campaign were split in opinions. The main supporters of the “pro-extraction” discourse (AP, the Conservative Party (*Høyre*), and the Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet* (FRP))) claimed there would be more possibilities for economic development of the region with resource extraction. Surprisingly, the eco-oriented image of the ‘red-green’ coalition appeared to be deceptive, because “the idea of the oil-free areas was removed” (Trædal 2012:28). The worries were further intensified since the center-right Conservative Party, and the right-wing Progress Party were considered to be the frontrunners of the campaign.

The “anti-extraction” protagonists claimed that the oil industry would bring irreparable harm for the marine ecosystem. The main opponents of leaving the area’s resources untouched were the Liberal Party (*Venstre* (V)), the Socialist Left Party, and the Green Party (*Miljøpartiet De Grønne*). Hanna E. Marcussen, leader of the Green Party, points out that Norwegian responsibility for the High North “...would be to leave these resources where they are” (Marcussen 2012:21).

The results of the election would seem to have defined the future development of the islands. A coalition between *Høyre* and FRP was formed after they won the

majority of votes in October 2013<sup>9</sup>. However, the alliance signed a Government Platform agreement (*Regjeringsplattform mellom Høyre og Fremskrittspartiet*) on October 7<sup>th</sup>, which claims that the sea area around Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja will not be opened for the oil industry for the period between 2013-2017 (Regjeringsplattformen 2013:63). The Platform emphasized environmental concern about the area with focus on sustainable development, declaring the establishment of a special environmental protection center (*miljøbase/oljevernbase*) on the islands. Does it mean that the right-wing coalition presents a more green stance than the previous government? The answer is not yet known. So far, the political decision to postpone the issue of drilling in the north of Norway leaves the question about the future of the environment in the Norwegian Arctic open.

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<sup>9</sup> Hereafter the coalition between *Høyre* and FRP referred to as the ‘blue-blue’ coalition.

## 2. Theory, Method and Thesis Structure

The analytical framework for this study is based on the approach of discourse theory, deriving from structuralist linguistic theories, such as that of Saussure<sup>10</sup>. Structuralist theory was first to emphasize the crucial role of language in maintaining our representation of the world through the creation of meanings and identities. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:9) point out that structuralism and poststructuralism are considered to be subcategories of the broader umbrella of social constructivism. Hence, the discourse theory approach is related to the constructivist paradigm, which states that our understanding of the world is based on mental “categories” which are changeable depending on the historical and cultural contexts in which they are embedded (Ibid. 5). The theory assumes that our worldview is directly influenced by our social interactions – through which we define what is true or false – and different ways of acting, which are conditioned by different understandings of the world, “therefore the social construction of knowledge and truth has social consequences” (Ibid. ).

Initially, discourse theory was developed by Michael Foucault, who worked with the notions of power, language and knowledge. In *The Archeology of Knowledge* (1969) Foucault poses the notion of an ‘episteme’ in order to determine how a “historical system of thought” (or ‘social mentality’) can be formed by “the preconditions for thought...” which in turn can “...define the limits of what can be thought or said” (Moses and Knutsen 2012:217). Foucault invented the ‘archeological method’ of discourse analysis in order to study discourses of the

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<sup>10</sup> According to this theory, signs (or words) possess a structure which consists of two levels: *langue* and *parole*. *Langue* is understood as a "structure of language" which is "fixed and unchangeable" (Jørgensen and Phillips 2009:10). *Parole* is a "situated language use, the signs actually used by people in specific situations" (Ibid). Within structuralism the main attention was devoted to *langue*, since this level was considered to be stable and independent from possible contextual mistakes or vitiations of language. The underestimation of *parole* led to the critique of structuralism and further, the development of poststructuralism.

past that are built on the scope of meaningful and true statements specific to each historical epoch (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:12). In his later work Foucault focuses on relations between knowledge and power and stresses the role of power in the construction of discourses and establishes the ‘genealogical method’ to study discursive practices. In his view, power can not necessarily be defined as oppressive, but is productive while it constitutes knowledge and discourses and spreads across social practices (Ibid.).

In spite of a broad theoretical grounding, Foucauldian discourse theory does not provide any specific methodology for the analysis of written or spoken language. His theory has been further developed by poststructuralist researches with the creation of methodological tools. According to Jensen and Skredsmo (2010:440) discourse analysis “is an integrated theoretical and methodological approach to analysis” that emphasizes “the role of language in the social construction of the world”.

For this study I chose the particular discourse methodology developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2013), and part of Norman Fairclough’s (1989) critical discourse theory. According to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) the strength of discourse analysis is that it can combine several methods from different theoretical approaches, as I have chosen. In addition, the methodological framework presents key concepts of this study: ‘geopolitics’, ‘soft securities’, and ‘sustainable development’. These are supplemented by John Dryzek’s (2013) classification of environmental discourses and Hajer’s (1995) concept of ‘story-line’.

## 2.1 Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory

Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) point out that Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory is an abstract but elaborate analytical approach. Language is understood as an unstable network of signs within language structures in contrast to structuralists who assume that "signs are locked in particular relationship with one another: every sign has a particular location in the net and its meaning is fixed" (Ibid. 10). Instability of structures explains why meanings can never be static and structures are always flexible and can be extended. Furthermore, such 'vulnerability' within language allows different discourses to participate in the battle for meaning and hegemony, which as a result will lead to the establishment of "dominance of one particular perspective" (Ibid.7).

Following the logic of this theory, the discourse analysis of the media public debate on the Arctic in both Norway and Russia can define the main competing discourses and reveal their struggle for dominance. According to Jensen (2007), one of the most dominant discourses around the Arctic in these two countries concerns petroleum production. The competing discourses include the environmental discourse, which derives from the dilemma of economic benefits versus nature conservation, and geopolitical discourse, focusing on resource sovereignty and security.

The discourses mentioned above consist of specific elements, or *nodal points* that, as Laclau and Mouffe stated, have a privilege to be the central signs around which the other signs are ordered (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Furthermore, the whole scope of potential but excluded meanings, according to Laclau and Mouffe, find their place in *the field of discursivity* or a "reservoir for the 'surplus of meanings' produced by the articulatory practice" (Ibid. 27). While the nodal points demand that meanings are fixed and belong to the signs that surround them, it is possible to assess what meanings are excluded, purposefully or not, by

the terms in special contexts. Following this logic, if the fixed meanings are represented by ‘moments’ and unfixed meanings by ‘elements’, Laclau and Mouffe formulate the aim of discourse as an attempt “to transform elements into moments by reducing their polysemy to a fully fixed meaning” (Ibid. 28).

Nevertheless, a nodal point can lack meaning until it is placed in a specific discourse. For instance, if a nodal point possesses a property of an element, it can be defined as a *floating signifier*. This notion is introduced in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (2013) in order to depict the essence of the nodal point: on the one hand, it gets a fixed meaning (moment) in a certain discourse, while on the other hand, as a floating signifier (element), it is the target of the struggle between discourses.

## 2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

The critical approach to discourse analysis proposed by Fairclough (1989) has also proven useful for this study. Fairclough claims that not all social practices can be defined as discursive, so there is a distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices. Furthermore, according to Fairclough, discourse is “a form of social practice which both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:61).

Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a primarily text-oriented approach combined with social analysis. However, it is also useful for the analysis of visual semiotics, or visual images related to text, in which there is a close connection between images and language (Ibid. 61). CDA is critical because it accepts unequal relations of power as a norm in the social world, but seeks to be politically committed to social change through reaching more equal power relations in the communicative sphere (Ibid. 64). Thus, according to

Fairclough, the aim of CDA is to explore “the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of the social order and in social change” (Ibid. 69).

Applying CDA to the public debate on the Arctic in Norway and Russia will help to understand, how the debate is constructed, the character of the power relations’ balance, and how the existing discursive structures can contribute to real policy making. The comparison of discursive structures of the official debate in Russia and Norway through secondary sources will make it possible to detect their mobilization and manipulative capacities and to contrast their influence on the Russian and Norwegian public debates.

The central notion proposed by Fairclough (1989) is *the order of discourse* that “is the sum of all genres and discourses which are in use within a specific social domain” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:72). In contrast to the field of discursivity (Laclau and Mouffe 2013), the order of discourse narrows down the discursive logic and choice of rhetorical tools according to the special order that exists in the social domain. It can delimit what can be said, but it is open to change. It means that Fairclough does not underestimate the possibility of language users to be creative and in a way improve this order by ‘importing discourses and genres from other orders of discourse’ (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:72). Other important elements of CDA are *interdiscursivity* (articulation of different discourses and genres in the communicative event) and *intertextuality* (intersection of a current communicative event with one or more earlier communicative events) (Ibid. 73). Fairclough points out that interdiscursivity of a high level is likely to produce changes, while low interdiscursivity will lead to reproduction of the order (Ibid. 82).

## 2.3 Dryzek's Classification of Environmental Discourses

In addition to Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory and Fairclough's CDA, this study also relies on John S. Dryzek's classification of environmental discourses. According to Dryzek (2013), environmental discourse is closely connected to industrialized society and appeared as an alternative understanding of the world facing environmental problems resulting from society's commitment to the idea of growth and material wellbeing.

To analyze environmental discourses, Dryzek (2013) uses the concept of 'story-line' by Maarten Hajer (1995) and supplements it with specific analytical tools. Hajer interprets the story-line as "a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena [...] [and since] people do not draw on comprehensive discursive systems for their cognition, rather these are evoked through story-lines" (1995:56). Sioni and Birkeland (2014:215) point out that a story-line "is therefore a mechanism for creating and maintaining meaning, and it speaks to particular ways of constructing a problem". In this context the change of environmental politics can be conditioned by the emergence of a new story-line and a corresponding change of perception and understanding of an issue (Ibid. 56). For his classification, Dryzek (2013) defines and analyzes four building blocks of a story-line, such as basic entities (the core ideas around which the discourse is constructed), assumptions about natural relationships, agents and their motives and key metaphors or rhetorical devices.

Within environmental discourses, Dryzek (2013:14) divides two main departures for the classification: prosaic and imaginative. The prosaic one emphasizes the necessity to limit economic growth in order to respond to the environmental crisis in a more effective way. The imaginative dimension can refer to environmental problems as "opportunities rather than troubles... treating environmental concerns



not in opposition to economic ones, but potentially in harmony” (Ibid. 15). These departures correlate with either radical or reformist ability to act and bring changes. Thus, the classification includes four main discursive lines, or abbreviated story-lines that, in turn, are divided into several other filiations, which are summarized below:

**The discourse of limits, boundaries, survival and its denial** (prosaic-radical):

The *discourse of survival and limits* follows the story-line that “human demands on the life support capacity of ecosystems threaten to explode out of control, and drastic action needs to be taken in order to curb these demands” (Ibid. 40);

*Promethean discourse*, however, recognizes the scope of problems but is persuaded by the infinite possibilities of technology to confront this scope successfully (and in addition appreciates market regulation tools) (Ibid 58).

**The discourse of problem solving** (prosaic-reformist):

*Administrative rationalism* “seeks to organize scientific and technical expertise into hierarchy in the service of state” (Ibid. 88);

*Democratic pragmatism* sees democracy as a key “way of approaching the problems” (Ibid. 99) through its ability to put public interest ahead of private interest (Ibid. 113);

*Economic rationalism* is committed to “the intelligent deployment of market mechanisms to achieve public ends” (Ibid. 122).

**The discourse of sustainability** (imaginative-reformist):

*Sustainable development* “rests on integration and a balanced consideration of economic and environmental goals and objectives in both public and private decision making” (Ibid 147);

*Ecological modernization* follows the story-line that “the capitalist political economy needs conscious reconfiguring and far-sighted action so that economic development and environmental protection can proceed hand-in-hand and reinforce one another” (Ibid. 173).

**The discourse of green radicalism** (imaginative-radical):

*Discourse of green consciousness* aims to change the way people think about the natural world towards a more empathetic attitude of nature (Ibid.);

*Discourse of green politics* stresses that “the social and ecological crises can only be resolved through political action and structural change” (Ibid. 218).

This study will examine what types of discourse are dominant in Russian and Norwegian public debates in terms of Dryzek’s classification. At the same time, I wish to find out to what extent discourses in public debate coincide with the dominant discourses in the official debates of Russia and Norway.

## 2.4 Classical and Critical Geopolitics

Discussing the Arctic from the perspective of security and energy conflicts is a significant part of the public debate in the region, which is why I refer to the concept of “geopolitics” in the analytical framework to this study.

The Arctic has historically been a region of limited geopolitical importance until recently when the United States Geological Survey (USGS) announced the discovery of extensive hydrocarbon deposits in the region,<sup>11</sup> leading to global media attention, and thus the need for securitization. Dittmer et al. (2011:203) point out that “the Arctic Ocean is being configured as an ‘anarchic space’”,

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<sup>11</sup> In 2008 the USGS published a report that the Arctic region contains 13% of world oil and 30% of world gas in undiscovered reserves (Brigham 2013)

requiring it be brought back to the center of realist geopolitics. According to the classical geopolitical approach, the aim of the geopolitical actor is to reach some specific goal regarding the actor's interests. As Ó Tuathail et al. (2006:6) note, "states must compete to survive". Thus, this approach is strongly connected to political realism which characterizes competition between states as a struggle for power. At the same time, it pays no attention to the landscape of the territory and its inhabitants, so environmental issues are not taken into consideration. As an outcome, within geopolitical discourse, Lassi (2013:38) points out that the meaning of security was extended, shifting the focus from national to environmental and human security (also see Berkman 2012). The latter types are often referred as "soft securities" (Jensen 2013b, Lassi 2013, Zysk 2013).

In this regard, when speaking about the Arctic, human and environmental security must be in focus. The approach of critical geopolitics, as a new trend in geopolitical studies, is said to be strongly connected to discourse theory and includes any type of "soft security". The authors of this concept, Ó Tuathail et al. (2006), stress three main limitations of the concept of classical geopolitics. First of all, it is an erroneous framing of the empirical history of international politics because the survival of states was not dependent only on competition and wars, but also cooperation. Secondly, he argues that political realism is a discourse that "does not see that it itself is a set of beliefs" (Ibid. 6). Thirdly, in their methodology, political realists look at world politics as a separate reality that, according to Ó Tuathail et al., is a limitation because people can view and understand the world through culture and language: "Discourse is not a neutral tool that describes objects already existing in the world but is involved in the very recognition and constitution of those objects (in worlding)" (Ibid. 7).

Moreover, common traits of classical geopolitics are state-centrality and importance of decision-making by elites, for example, a group of "wise men" who are responsible for everything. Ó Tuathail et al. (2006) argue that critical

geopolitics provides us with broader understanding beyond elitist conception and that each state has its own geopolitical culture “of conceptualizing their state and its unique identity, position and role in the world” (Ibid. 7). Geopolitical culture is supposed to be formed historically according to different forms of state-building and development of the state apparatus and legal structures. Furthermore, it shapes “how states behave culturally in the world” (Ibid. 8).

Within his critical theory, Ó Tuathail distinguishes between three types of geopolitical discourse: *formal*, *practical* and *popular*. Formal geopolitics is provided by intellectuals as their vision and theory regarding geopolitical issues. Practical geopolitics, according to Ó Tuathail et al. (Ibid. 9) refers to the narratives used by policy makers and politicians in the actual practice of the foreign policy –literally speaking, political speeches and actions. Lastly is popular geopolitics, whose discourses can be founded in the public debate, and furthermore is the most important type used in this study. The three-dimensional model of the critical perspective on geopolitics is much broader than the classical one. In terms of the issue of security within Arctic discourse it opens the possibility to extend the focus from purely ‘national security’ to ‘environmental’ and ‘human security’.

## 2.5 Sustainable Development: a Definition

The most common definition of sustainable development is usually cited from the report, *Our Common Future*, and is said to be a form of development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987). According to Nilsen (2010:496), the main focus of this definition “...is on maximizing the utility of human beings” which will not decline over time. However, all possible approaches to define sustainable development can be divided into two groups: “weak sustainable development”

(WSD) and “strong sustainable development” (SSD). The 1987 WCED definition, which is by far the most accepted definition, is a variant of WSD. Ultimately, Nilsen (2010) concludes that the global community and national governments should admit the efficiency and enforce the transition towards the SSD paradigm. From the position of SSD “interests of humans are not to have an overriding priority over the interests of nature”, plus “economy and nature are both to be sustained as they are complementary” (Ibid. 495).

## 2.6 Sources under Scrutiny

The methodological framework of this study is based on two methods: the comparative method and discourse analysis. The comparative method of differences is used to compare several correlated variables, for example, orders of discourses and story-lines. According to this method, comparison is made between systems which “share a number of common features as a way of neutralizing some differences while highlighting others” (Moses and Knutsen 2012:99). In order to conduct the comparative analysis, the sources of information should be chosen according to the principle of correlation.

Comparative study of Russian and Norwegian debates on the Arctic includes a timeline from May 2013 until May 2014. During this year my focus on press and radio sources aimed at examining both official and public perspectives on the issue. Official documents (*The Fundamentals of State Policy* and *The High North Strategy*) are used further in this research. The debate platform for the analysis includes: two general audience and two business newspapers and two radio channels. These media sources presented material in both Russian and Norwegian, and all examples from these texts are presented as my own translations of the source.

For the purpose of this study, newspapers such as the Russian *Rossiyskaya gazeta* and the Norwegian *Aftenposten* represent how the Arctic issue has been covered by official newspapers during the last year. In total, the database for this research contains 54 articles from *Rossiyskaya gazeta* and 50 articles from *Aftenposten*. In order to examine the economic perspective on the Arctic, two business publications were chosen, the Russian paper, *Kommersant* and the Norwegian paper, *Dagens Næringsliv* (40 and 31 articles, respectively). All the articles have been retrieved via digital archives through keyword searches in Russian and Norwegian of the terms for ‘Arctic’ and ‘high north’ (nordområdene), combined with terms such as ‘oil and gas’, ‘resources’, ‘Northern Sea Route’, ‘security’, ‘sustainable development’, ‘environment’ etc.

The radio channels analyzed discussing Arctic issues during the period of study include the Russian station, *Ekho Moskvyy* (Echo of Moscow), which held 12 debates about the Arctic on different program such as “Osoboje mnenije” (Special Opinion), “Oblozhka-1” (Cover-1), “Blog-Aut” (Blog-Out), “Bolshoj Dozor” (Big Watch) and “Ischem vihod” (Search for Remedies). On the Norwegian radio station, *NRK P2*, there were fourteen debates on the program “Dagnytt Atten” and seven debates on the program “Ekko”. All of the sources have digital archives through their homepages.

## 2.7 Relation of the Theory to the Thesis.

This study explores environmental public debate in the broad context of Arctic discourse in Russian and Norwegian media. This context includes the scope of discourses which circulate in the Arctic discursive space. I focus on the key issues (nodal points) which represent the dominant discourses in the examined media. According to Laclau and Mouffe (2013) these discourses are ‘struggling’ to establish a hegemony of the ‘Arctic’ meaning. Furthermore, these discourses

are framed differently within two debate dimensions – official and public. Both perspectives are taken into account in this study. Thus, I intend to examine the position and power of the Russian and Norwegian public spheres in terms of advancing and defending their environmental standings regarding the Arctic. The role of the researcher, according to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:21), is to “work with what has actually been said or written, exploring patterns in and across the statements and identifying the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality”.

As has already been mentioned in this section, this study is embedded in a constructivist knowledge paradigm. The representations of the world are changeable depending on historical context. As we will see in the next chapter, various Arctic narratives retrieved from history have the capacity to shape our modern representations about this region and frame the Arctic debate. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary character of this study implies that the environmental aspect of Arctic discourse is tightly intertwined with other issues, so must be examined in relation to them. These include political, social, economic, ecological, and geopolitical perspectives of the Arctic discourse.

## 2.8 Outline of the Thesis

The first two chapters of the thesis are devoted to the research design. The aim and research questions of the thesis are presented in the first chapter, as well as background information to clarify the context of the Arctic discourse. The theoretical and methodological framework is presented separately in the second chapter along with the main concepts used in the study and data collection description.

The third chapter sets the scene with a historical description reaching back to ancient times. Additionally, I focus on the narratives of the Arctic region according to the Russian and Norwegian historical-cultural backgrounds. The aim of this chapter is to discover how those images have influenced the modern public debate while creating an argument in favor or against the current ‘Northern Dimension’ policy of the Russian and Norwegian governments.

The fourth chapter is entirely devoted to the discourse analysis of the previously mentioned media sources. It points out the key Arctic issues and main stakeholders within the debate. Further, it gives a detailed analysis of resource, security and environmental discourses. In the end the power and engagement of the Russian and Norwegian public spheres in terms of environmental debate will be partly investigated.

The fifth chapter examines ethical aspects within the environmental debate. It elucidates the major dilemmas, sources of ethics and whether Russians and Norwegians draw on ecological consciousness in respect to the Arctic issue. In general, this chapter aims to present a broad picture of the environmental debate in the Arctic.

The main findings and conclusions are summarized in the last chapter, present my reflections about the impact of public debate on an actual ‘Northern Dimension’ policy in both countries.



### 3. Arctic Narratives

*The Arctic is a landscape of lichens and mountains, snowflakes and icebergs, saxifrage, creeping willow, pebbles ground to gemstone perfection, and vast formations of ice, contours of rocks, sweeping geomorphic crenellations draped with greys and smoky greens, draped with the shadows of winds and the colours of snow.*

*(Moss 1997:4)*

The Arctic has tantalized the human imagination for many centuries, and in the modern age, it has become “the last frontier of civilization’s global, national, and commercial development” (Greenberg 2009:1310). One of the most important components of Arctic discourse is presented by narratives which are deeply embedded in the historical and cultural legacies of many states. In this regard, the narratives produce representations, attitudes and beliefs that strike a chord with national identities. When issues about the Arctic are discussed in the public sphere, argumentation is usually bound by cultural and national lines of reasoning.

This chapter aims survey the evolution of meaning in narratives about the Arctic through the cultural-historical lenses of Russia and Norway. The term “narrative” comes from literature studies and, refers simply to a sequence of events. They are typically used in both textual and visual forms. Fludernik (2009:6) defines a narrative as “a representation of a possible world in a linguistic and/or visual medium, at whose center there are one or several protagonists of an anthropomorphic nature who are existentially anchored in a temporal and spatial sense and who (mostly) perform goal-directed actions”.

Thus, narratives are the stories that create our representations of the ‘object’ through the power of images. Moss (1999:339) points out, that “words in narratives deliver images within, where the visceral encoding of seen and unseen

merge, and the artfully imagined takes precedence over actuality’’. Arctic history is filled with rich narratives that shape our representations of the region in the present day.

Tracing these narratives in the public debate helps to decipher diverse patterns of understanding of the Arctic. In a long-term perspective, these patterns have always been a part of various Arctic discourses. Through the agency of language, narratives are able to ‘load’ the key nodal points with specific meaning.

Moreover, discourses of the Arctic have always been highly intertextual due to their connection with realities from different contexts (Schimansky and Spring 2010). Interestingly, as an important part of the historical-cultural background, national narratives can be invoked either consciously or unconsciously in the public debate (Ryall et al. 2010).

Exploration of the last blank spot on the map implied that Arctic discourse was closely intertwined with colonial discourses (i.e. Ryall et al. 2010, Schimansky and Spring 2010, Chartier 2006). Susanne Frank points out that “as a part of colonial discourse, the Arctic discourse can be seen as an occidental discursive unit common to all nations directly or indirectly involved in the conquest” (2010:106). As a part of colonial discourse, Arctic discourse put emphasis on the relations/opposition between man and nature in contrast to a classical opposition of different human cultures (Ibid.).

In order to get a detailed overview of the Arctic narratives that Russian and Norwegian public debates draw on, the chapter is divided into six parts. The first part briefly reviews representations of the Arctic in world history, since their influence can be traced to the present. The second and the third sections give an overview of the main national narratives present in Russian and Norwegian public debates. The fourth and the fifth parts present the Arctic from the perspective of indigenous communities and “outsiders”. And the sixth part

presents the important dichotomy of a warm vs. cold Arctic, whose role is discussed at the end of the chapter.

### 3.1 Representations of the North in World History

Today, the Arctic can be viewed as a kingdom of the polar bear and a region rich with natural resources. It is difficult to imagine that millions years ago it was constituted by different animals and representations. Moreover, in prehistoric times, the climate of the North was much warmer, so that it supported a vastly different ecosystem than the present, which today would seem as if out of a fairy tale to modern Norwegians, Russians, Inuit or Sami peoples.<sup>12</sup> Generally, the earth's climate fluctuates between warming and cooling periods, which has influenced Arctic ecosystems and cultures alike. What today appears like a stable landscape and cast of human cultures is actually in flux. The process of colonization of the Arctic by prehistoric peoples attests to this as people settled the region in several waves (Kozlowski and Bandi 1984:360), causing several changes in turn, like the extinction of mammoths.

Thousands of years later, citizens of the ancient “center of the world” in Greece were lost in conjectures about the world beyond the known frontiers. Hellenic peoples were the first who informed the modern world about their representations of the North through written sources. Although it was not possible for them to know about the existence of polar bears in the most remote northern part of their imaginative world map, the main bearings for ancient mariners were serendipitously the celestial constellations *Ursa Major* and *Ursa Minor*. Referring to Greek myths, these *ursae* or “bears” guided boats as well as

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<sup>12</sup> For instance, once paleontological study estimated that the “Arctic was approximately 40°C warmer than it is today” (Greenberg 2009:1318) in the Eocene period (55-50 million years ago), meaning the Arctic was essentially subtropical.

imaginations out at sea and in the broader culture. One of the versions of the myth says that Zeus turned his lover Callisto into a bear in order to save her from his jealous wife, Hera. Despite reliance on these navigation ‘guides’, the Northern edge of the world was rather a subject of myth-making than of exploration. In anticipation of later discoveries in of the savage Arctic beast, ancient Greeks referred to north as *àrktos*, or “bear” (Schimansky and Spring 2010:34, Lopez 1986).

Myths related to the unexplored lands fulfilled important functions in Hellenic period. For instance, the story about the mystical island *Hyperborea* – meaning “beyond the northern wind, Boreas” – narrates the lives of the mysterious and prosperous Hyperboreans. Favored by the gods, their level of purity and virtue, along with a festive lifestyle were the traits that distinguished them from Greeks (Romm 1992:67). Favored by Apollo, and of an apparently “superior race”, Hyperboreans could afford being arrogant and, thus, challenge the value-system of the Greeks. Romm (1992) emphasizes the capacities of the “...godlike Hyperboreans” who seemed able to “...outshine the Greek at every turn” (Ibid 61). The belief in the existence of a superior northern people reflected evidence of the Greeks’ awareness of their own imperfection. Additionally, the representations of the ocean at that time were important. The ocean represented uncontrollable and unpredictable forces, and it was not until the time of Alexander the Great that the extent of the reach of the sea even began to be known.

During the Roman Empire, knowledge about the island *Thule* on the northern edge of the world appeared after Marseillan Pytheas’ travels (around the 4th century BCE). He claimed to have discovered the last unknown and the most remote area on the map. On the one hand, this fact inspired many Roman politicians and artists. Seneca in his drama, “*Medea*”, was the first who used the phrase, “*Ultima Thule*” (the edge of the world) (Maurie 2003:9). The image of

the mysterious island beyond the *oikoumene* (known land) ended up being “a powerful symbol of Rome’s renewal and future greatness” (Romm 1992:123).

On the other hand, this perspective frightened those who did not share the state’s ambition to gain wealth and fame from finding Thule. Such skepticism was actively expressed by the famous Roman consul, Seneca and Roman poet, Horace. The main barrier on the way to the island was considered to be created by the ocean. Influenced by Pytheas’ representation of the sea around the island – “a sea congealed by the cold” (Malaurie 2003:9) – Tacitus admits the impossibility of reaching Thule. Roman historians seemed to believe “...that this one region of the world, where Rome faced a boundary imposed by nature rather than by barbarian armies, must remain forever closed, and that divine anger would destroy any further expeditions sent out to explore it” (Romm 1992:149). The motive for crossing the remotest frontiers without fear was followed by the counter-discourse, stating that “Seneca and others see Rome’s maritime expansion as the final stage in a long slide toward reckless ambition, amorality, and self-annihilation” (Ibid. 123).

While Thule for Romans remained in the realm of dreams, their ambitions and curiosity allowed the conquering of part of the British Isles. Not until the Middle Ages did European explorers finally penetrate further northwards. Vaughan (1987) points out, that the first medieval explorer of the Arctic may have been from Ireland. The sixth-century voyages led by Abbot Brendan (St. Brendan the Navigator) resulted in the first realistic Arctic narratives. Archeological evidence and place-names showed that Irish explorers visited a number of existing lands, even though their narratives contain such fabulous features as islands inhabited by laughing and weeping people, cats’ heads and other unlikely phenomena (Ibid.).

Later, from the ninth century, the northward advances were conducted by Vikings. Driven by the search for new lands, they established trading connections with the settlers of the White Sea coast (Bjarmaland expeditions) and founded colonies in Iceland and southern Greenland (discussed in more detail below).

Nevertheless, Vaughan (1987:337) points out the prevalence of “medieval ignorance about the Arctic”. Of course, several realistic features about the North can be found in medieval sources due to the contribution made by several medieval explorers, cartographers and chroniclers. For instance, the Irish monk, Dicuil, mentioned Iceland, identifying it as Thule. The Saxon cleric, Adam of Bremen, gathered information about Vikings’ advances to the North. The Danish chronicler, Saxo Grammaticus, described the life of indigenous Finns and their skiing skills (Ibid.). However, the majority of the medieval references to the North usually contained a thin line between the real and the imagined.

Olaus Magnus, a priest from Sweden, likely made the most remarkable contribution to medieval knowledge about the North. In his work, *On Animals*, he made accurate descriptions of polar bears, walruses, falcons, and even made the earliest description of whaling. Magnus is also known for the work, *Carta Marina* (1539), which contains descriptions of the North and its marvels (Lewis 2013a). According to Vaughan (1987:337), Magnus “includes a good deal of legendary or fanciful material, much of it medieval: [...] huge fishes swallow ships; giants have a special section devoted to them, and there are duels with dragons and serpents”. According to Chet van Duzer (2013), the beastly art was used by cartographers in order to illustrate the possible dangers of seafaring in unexplored regions of the world.

The embellished maps and globes of the Middle Ages testified to the general ignorance of the Arctic of the times (Vaughan 1987). The summary knowledge of the Arctic held by medieval Europeans did not go beyond the image of a cold, icy

place, inhabited by fearsome animals and monsters with the backdrop of the midnight sun in summer and the winter darkness.

If curiosity about the North appeared in the Middle Ages, it was supported by economic interest. Commercial attention was directed at the natural resources of the North. In the 13<sup>th</sup> century, relatively advanced maritime explorations resulted in the establishment of the trading routes between Greenland, Iceland, Novgorod and its hinterlands, Bergen in Norway and several German cities (Ibid. 332). It was a time of commercial prosperity for the Hanseatic League, and Norway and Russia were the main resource exporting countries of the period.

From the perspective of northern territories, coastal settlers from northern Norway and the Kola Peninsula (northwest Russia) had established trading connections ever since the time of the Vikings. These trading routes existed through the Middle Ages and from the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the trading pattern became known as “Pomor trade”.

Later, in the age of discovery (15<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries) maps of the North were improved significantly. Part of North Sea route was explored by the Dutch navigator, William Barents (1550-1597), whose goal was to find a shorter way to the East Indies. As a result, he was the first to discover the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) archipelago and reached the Eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya Island in 1597. Russian advances to the north and east occurred instead as a land-based conquest. Driven by the search for fur, all of western Siberia was seized by 1620 (Greenberg 2009). At the same time, a series of geographical explorations defined clearer borders of the Canadian North.

From the perspective of the main medieval consumer of goods – Catholic Europe – “the riches of the North” undoubtedly contributed to overcoming the common ignorance of the Arctic region. While the demand for furs and fishery products was increasing, economic development of the Russian and Norwegian “resource

provinces” and trading centers occurred. The fishery sources of the Barents Sea supported the Norwegian export of cod, salmon, walrus tusks, and whale oil until the decline of Hanseatic trade. While dried cod filled the Norwegian treasury, furs and pelts were the “soft gold” (Slezkine and Diment 1993) for Russians. To secure access and the supply of furs, constant military incursions were made to Siberia. According to Bobrick (1992), however, the decline of the fur trade started from the early 18th century.

The resources from the North have been continuously depleted since the Middle Ages. The period from the 16<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> centuries was marked by industrial whaling. Greenberg (2009:1346) points out, that “the most important driver for aggressive Arctic whaling [...] was the extraction of whale oil and fat for energy markets and industrial production throughout Western Europe”. As a result, the rapid decline in numbers of species had a crucial impact on the Arctic ecosystem. The populations of several whale species have still not fully recovered from whaling in this period. It is estimated that around 38,000 Greenland right whales were killed by the British fleet in the Davis Strait fishery, and as of 1986, the species numbered only 200 (Lopez 1986:10).

Polar exploration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries uncovered the last blank spots of the Arctic. The Austro-Hungarian North Pole expedition in 1872 reached the Franz Josef Land archipelago. Norwegian polar explorers conducted several successful expeditions, reaching the North and the South Poles (more on this below). These achievements became sensational media events which proclaimed the Arctic to be more accessible and explorable than previously thought.

As we can see, the history of human contact and interaction with the Arctic is long and varied, which in turn has affected the evolution of the region’s representation. But over the course of the twentieth century, a foundation was



laid for the demystification of the Arctic in the Western public discourse. Chartie (2007) points out that modern understanding and representation of the North are buttressed by two important aspects. First of all, “denothernization” was influenced by demographic, economic development and climate change that decreased the severity of conditions in the Arctic (Ibid. 36). The second aspect is the concept of “receding the North” in which exploration and research of the last blank spot on the world map also caused the boundaries of the discourse to be constantly pushed back towards the North Pole. This, according to Chartie (2007) revealed “the inflexibility of the conception of North, which is at the root its inevitable disappearance” (Ibid.).

Reinforcement of the resource discourse happened in an epoch of rapid industrial development. In the context of the demand for minerals, the Northern territories were far but left out. In the Western Hemisphere, passions were running high with “Gold fever” (1896) as prospectors flooded north to the Klondike. Who could have thought at the time that this northern territory could be valuable for anything other than its gold? Indeed, the US infatuation with Alaska’s mineral riches has a long history (see Greenberg 2009:1353).

To the east, a new Bolshevik government “...intensified efforts to exploit Siberia’s natural resources for Soviet national development” (Ibid. 1354). Present-day Russia places a stake on the Arctic deposits of fossil fuels with the same motive. Similarly, the North Sea oil deposits, found by Norwegian companies in 1960s have provided economic development and prosperity for Norway up to the present-day.

To sum up, the 20<sup>th</sup> century was a turning point in Arctic history. The resource cocktail – furs, fish, whales, gold, minerals, oil, and gas – has historically promoted exploration, colonization, and exploitation of the Arctic region. The neighboring countries of Russia and Norway have been complicit in the various

resource rushes of the Arctic from the very beginning, which in turn have had an impact on the environmental history of the region.

The following sections deal with the specific historical backgrounds of Russia and Norway and national Arctic narratives. Nowadays, both countries are active participants in the discussions about the Arctic's future. The discursive spaces that they share include economic, security, environmental and scientific dimensions.

### 3.2 Arctic Narratives in Russian History and Culture

The Russian Arctic consists of the northern territories of European Russia, north of the Ural region and Siberia, and northern Asia. Gradually over a long period of time this area and its inhabitants were integrated into Russian national history and culture. In the previous section, the “fur rush” resulted in extensive advances to the northeast of Russia towards the White Sea (11<sup>th</sup> century) and the Pechora basin (12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> centuries) (Armstrong 1963:41). Slezkine and Diment (1993) point out that the first contact with Siberia east of the Ural Mountains took place already in the 11th century. Approaching this region, known as “the Rock” (Urals), these early advances, made by Orthodox Christians, were rather peaceful.

The histories of the Russian Arctic and Siberia are closely related. Emmerson (2011:43) points out that interest in Northern Siberia was always supported by strong personalities and their particular interests. Representations of Siberia were similar to those from the ancient and medieval sources, “as both the frightening heart of darkness and fabulous land of plenty” (Slezkine and Diment 1993:2).

The first military conquest of Siberia happened under the rule of Tsar Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century. It was sponsored by the Russian merchant, Stroganov, whose goal was to gain access to the rich forests of Siberia. The

Cossack detachment, led by Ermak, invaded the Khanate of Sibir in 1581 and conquered it in 1585.

Afterwards, Russian territory extended gradually due to military campaigns. At the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, only the far east of the Asian continent was left. This remaining task came upon the Russian Emperor, Peter the Great (1672-1725), who was an ardent proponent of Europeanization of the country. For the Emperor, Siberia was “an Asiatic colony” – exotic, but backward. As the most modern ruler since the creation of the Russian state, Peter the Great was the first to realize the importance of this “colony” – especially its northern territories – for the future progress and development of the country. To the mind of the time, “still exotic, Siberia continued to combine the ridiculous and the sublime, except that now it was the presence of minerals (*zolotoe dno*) that made it wonderful and the absence of culture (*dikost*) that made it terrible” (Slezkine and Diment 1993:3).

During Peter’s rule, a remarkable contribution was made to the maps of the Siberian coastline. From 1739 to 1742, the Russian Baltic Fleet, under the guidance of Dmitry Laptev, mapped the Siberian coasts. Vitus Bering’s expedition first rounded the Kamchatka peninsula in 1729 (the First Kamchatka Expedition). One of the tasks was to test the possibility of reaching Asia through the Northern Sea Route. The Emperor valued the potential of the region, so he relegated the development of the northern territories to the descendants of the colonization.

The Great Northern Expedition (the Second Kamchatka Expedition, 1733-1743) was the biggest and longest scientific expedition in the world at the time. It resulted in mapping northeast Asia, exploring Alaska and several North American archipelagos. The scientists taking part in the expedition contributed to natural scientific and ethnographic research.

Another effort to sail through the Northeast Passage was supported by the famous Russian scientist, Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov (1711-1765), the head of the geographical department of the Russian Academy of Science. The expedition, led by Vasili Chichagov, did not succeed in sailing through the entire passage in 1765. Nevertheless, the contribution to cartography was significant. Lomonosov was the author of the first circumpolar map (1764).

Scientific research on Siberia came along with the development of the first industrial factories during the 18th century. Bobrick (1992) points out that the development of copper mining made the Russian Empire into the leading exporter of copper in the world by 1740. Apart from copper, several deposits of minerals and precious metals were exploited. Greenberg (2009:1351) states that the Russian population of Siberia was estimated at about 300,000 people in 1700 and grew to 1.8 million by 1850. Apart from those who moved to the region voluntarily in search of employment, the vast majority of mining and factory workers were exiles and convicts. Slezkine and Diment (1993:4) portray Siberia as the “ultimate symbol of both independence and exploitation”:

*On the one hand [...] [Siberia] represented the tradition of “free and popular colonization”, communal values, personal dignity, and relative peasant prosperity; on the other, it was a backward and long-suffering colony used as a source of raw materials and as a dumping ground for human refuse from Russia. (Ibid.)*

One of the regime “victims”, Josef Djughashvili – known as Josef Stalin – was exiled to the area of Kureika, northern Siberia from 1914 to 1917. Emmerson (2011:33) points out that “the Arctic had left its mark on the man [...] Siberia remained lodged in [Stalin] for the rest of his life”. Undoubtedly, almost none of the Soviet leaders knew the Arctic and understood its difficulties and potentials as well as Stalin. This knowledge may have served as inspiration for the future soviet program of Arctic development and the development of the GULags.

Thus, by the time the Bolsheviks came to power after the October Revolution of 1917, the new government faced the same contradiction related to development of Siberia and Russian Arctic that had to be overcome in order to build socialistic space equally throughout Eurasia. The “schizophrenic” present of Siberia (Slezkine and Diment 1993) – its great past of romantic backwardness in combination with a promising, prosperous future – did not frighten the positive builders of communism. As soon as they ruined the old state foundations, the creation of the new ones started. It was followed with a special focus on the development of the Siberian Arctic, or “The Far North” (*Krajnij Sever*).

The first priority of the Soviet government was industrial development generated through “...enormous increases in Russian settlement, mining, and industrialization to extend the Soviet power across all northern territories and exploit rich deposits in iron, copper, nickel, lead, zinc, iron ore, rare metals [...] and energy resources...” (Greenberg 2009:1354). Stalin’s claim about the concentration of “colossal wealth” in the Arctic and Northern Siberia made this region of the highest priority for infrastructure development and scientific research (Ibid. 1354).

Thus, the government established a state monopoly on scientific research which was accompanied by constant efforts to set new records in Arctic exploration. Youngs (2010:145) argues that the period of 1932-1938 can be considered “the Soviet golden age in the Arctic”. The most remarkable achievements of that period were the first one-year navigation of the Northern Sea Route in 1932 led by Otto Schmidt and the landing of the aircraft flown by Valerii Chkalov at the North Pole in 1937. The most outstanding innovation in research by Soviet scientists was the establishment of the polar stations on drifting ice floes. The first station, “North Pole-1” (*Severnij Polus-1* or “SP-1”) was led by Ivan Papanin in 1937. The dual tasks of the stations were to gather scientific data and

“colonize the Polar region” in order to show that a great number of people could live “normally” in Arctic conditions (Frank 2010:117).

Nevertheless, development and research on the region could not be separated from the development of the rest of the Soviet territories. One of the peculiarities of this development project was its emphasis on connecting the Arctic to the center and rest of the country (Ibid. 117). In other words the synchronized development of the center and periphery could occur by means of “normalization” (Ibid.).

All the activities in the North were accompanied and reviewed by the state propaganda machine. In the 1930s, the polar explorers were the first heroes of the country celebrated in Soviet mass culture. Moreover, Soviet literature was an important agent of ideology. Narrating the successful polar explorations was important in order to integrate “the Arctic into symbolical construction of national space” (Ibid. 107). Here we can talk about the creation of the specific soviet Arctic narratives.

Frank (2010:109) argues that the main characteristic of the soviet Arctic narrative was to overcome the image of a cold and hostile place. The soviet literature of the 1930s used several techniques of compelling representations: appealing to technical innovations, social warmth and imagination. The most famous Soviet science fiction author, Aleksandr Beljaev, wrote his novel *Under the Arctic sky* (“Pod nebom Arktiki”) in 1938. The main idea of the book is to convince the reader that innovative technologies can overcome the general darkness and cold of the Arctic. The artificial warming and lighting provide the perfect living conditions in a utopian place which is associated with a prosperous Soviet future.

Another example is Ilya Selvinskij’s epic poem, “Celjuskinites” (1937-1938). The members of Cheluskin’s expedition are portrayed as new Soviet heroes who overcome the harsh conditions by social warmth and imagination. They are not

like the typical Western heroes who constantly struggle against nature and suffer from its severe conditions. The Soviet heroes live in the atmosphere of the social warmth which is achieved by “irradiating the heat from inside” and sharing it with each other (Frank 2010:115). The second method includes “transporting oneself by imagination into warm surroundings”. Frank (2010) points out, that the “Soviet ‘warmth’ – sympathetic or imaginative as it may be – is powerful enough to overcome even Arctic cold and to enable Soviet people to withstand the conditions of Arctic climate as if they were quite ordinary” (Ibid.). Thus, the Soviet Arctic narrative represents an Arctic counter-discourse which transforms this place of death into an area where life thrives.

Frank (2010:110) concludes: “what today in the age of actual polar warming is perceived as a symptom of catastrophic climate change, was considered as a positive utopian perspective in the Soviet Union of the 1930s”.

The dystopian image of the development of the North appears when we think about GULag, the Soviet system of forced labor camps. The practical and economic account of using free, forced labor overshadowed the essence of the great human tragedy that happened in the North during Stalinist development. Slave and free labor built the “Stalin Sea-Baltic Sea Canal,” the Arctic railways and the Kolyma and Vorkuta mines. Forced labor abounded between 1928 and 1958 and declined some years after Stalin’s death (Armstrong 1963). In order to stimulate the population influx to the North, the government attracted skilled labor by using economic incentives – increased salaries and pensions, longer holidays – and loud patriotic calls (Armstrong 1963, 1967).

This part of Arctic history was not forgotten but reincarnated in the illegal camp literature from 1960s that started steadily eroding the utopian Stalinist ideas and illusions about “normal life” in the Arctic.

The Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) was a turning point in the history of the country. During the post-war years of recovery, Soviet Russia tried to regain its status both within and outside the country. Due to the period of confrontation between the superpowers – the “Cold War” – the discourse of the Arctic became predominantly militaristic. To portray the progress in development in the sphere of space exploration, scientific and military innovations the state propaganda machine found new Soviet heroes and narratives. Thus, Yuri Gagarin, the first man who flew to space, overshadowed Valeri Chkalov, the first man to fly to the North Pole.

The arms race between the USSR and the USA facilitated constant military training exercises, rocket-firing, and nuclear weapons testing. Several military firing ranges and bases were built in the Arctic. The multiple nuclear weapons experiments resulted in a myriad of nuclear waste dumped into the ocean, which became “the submariner’s private sea” (Greenberg 2009: 1373). The North was of the highest strategic importance because the nuclear warheads could hit the target across the shortest distance.

Later, the establishment of the Arctic as a “zone of peace” was an unexpected proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev, made during his speech in Murmansk in 1987. The demilitarization of the region was aimed at making northern Europe “nuclear-free” and, thus, to decrease stress on the Arctic environment. In terms of environmental protection, Gorbachev stressed the importance of cooperation between Arctic coastal countries (Gorbachev 1987). Additionally, he referred to Gro Harlem Brundtland and thanked her for the contribution that was made during her chairmanship of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).

Gorbachev’s speech laid the foundation for the end of the Cold War.

“Desecuritization” of the Arctic left the region in relative peace for another 15



years. However, the ignorance of the region, like during medieval times, did not last long. The wave of interest in northern Russia surged again a few years after Vladimir Putin became the Russian president. From 2000 until 2010, the issue of the Russian Arctic gained moderate coverage in Russian media. This study shows increased media exposure of the Arctic-related articles in printed sources and topics on the radio during the period of May 2013-2014. The region's resource potential and security, along with its ecological status became topics of interest once again.

Gorbachev's Murmansk speech seemed to be filed away in the history vault when in October 2013 Vladimir Putin was informed about a Russian professor who proposed to place the Arctic under international control. The president's reaction was sharp and he accused the professor in public for being a "meathead" (*pridurok*) and supporting an "anti-patriotic mood" (Kolesnikov 2013; Medvedev 2013). Furthermore, the president's counter-argument was the fact that the "flight time of American missiles over the Bering strait to Moscow amounts to 15-16 minutes" and that submarines "...are there... [under the North Pole]" (Ibid.). As Greenberg points out, the Arctic is "a regional theatre for NATO-Russia military confrontation and nuclear proliferation in the Cold War era, and today" (2009:1388).

### 3.3 Arctic Narratives in Norwegian History and Culture

Norwegian contributions to the earliest representations of the Arctic cannot be underestimated. First and foremost, Norwegian Vikings were famous for their voyages and establishment of the first settlements in Iceland and southern Greenland. In 874 the Viking, Ingolfur Arnarson, arrived with his family and followers and made a homestead near what is now the center of Reykjavik (Vaughan 1987:316). Another Viking, Erik the Red, prosecuted by law, escaped

from Norway in 986 with a colony of people. This colony reached and settled in southern Greenland, founding a community that lived there for the next five centuries (Ibid.). Although, these territories are commonly perceived as northern lands, they lie below the Arctic Circle, so we can conclude that Vikings' colonial expeditions were directed rather westwards than northwards.

At the same period, Vikings' advances eastwards at the end of the ninth-century opened more Arctic territories. These journeys were driven both by commercial-trading interests and by desire for military conquests and plundering. The journey led by the adventurer, Ottar, included sailing around the North Cape of Norway. Vaughan (1987:317) points out that due to this journey the parallel of 70° north was undoubtedly reached. After the North Cape expedition, Ottar sailed southwards along the Eastern Kola Peninsula, reaching the coasts of the White Sea – the territory known as Bjarmaland. Thus, Vikings were first to contact the area's local peoples: the Sami of northern Norway and Bjarmaland. The Svalbard archipelago (74°-81° north latitude) was discovered by Vikings, according to the Icelandic annals under the year 1194 (Ibid. 319).

The discovery of Bjarmaland resulted in the start of a fur trade in 1026 and the establishment of the Bjarmaland trading company by the Norwegian King, Olaf the Fat (Ibid. 318). Only in the 13<sup>th</sup> century did Norwegian settlements begin appearing in the far north of Norway (Ibid. 319). After the last recorded Bjarmaland expedition in 1222, the Russian manufacturing center, Novgorod, organized several expeditions to the north of Norway. In order to protect the territory against plundering, the fortress of Vardø was built in 1307, which “blocked further Norwegian settlement eastwards from Vardø and Kirkenes, and Russian settlement north-westwards” (Ibid.).

As mentioned in the previous section, the general ignorance about the Arctic dominated in medieval Europe. Admittedly, this was less true for Norway, which

was one of the closest lands to the Arctic. The Norwegian journeys northwards resulted in extensive knowledge about the northern seas and their inhabitants. Two sensational manuscripts by unknown authors were created in 13<sup>th</sup> century Norway as a result.

*Konungs skuggsjå* or “King’s mirror”, written in Norwegian is a dialogue between a father and son, containing a unique account of marine creatures. Despite the mention of mermen, mermaids and more realistic polar bears that wander about on the ice and hunt seals, 24 species of whales were described with impressive details, including their appearance and diet (Whitaker 1984). Research on the manuscript concludes that it circulated in Scandinavia for a while though it was first published in 1763. The English translator of the manuscript points out:

*It was written in the most backward section of Scandinavia on the very edge of European civilization; and yet it reveals a knowledge of the world, an appreciation of culture, and liberal outlook that we should not expect to find in thirteenth century Norway (Whitaker 1984:9).*

Another manuscript written in Latin, *Historia Norvegiae*, was created approximately at the same time as *Konungs skuggsjå*. Despite repetition of the same facts from *Konungs skuggsjå*, some peculiar details emerge from this manuscript. For instance, Greenland is said to be a “promontory of a mainland linking it to Bjarmaland and Russia”; the descriptions the Finns resemble those written by Adam of Bremen and describe them wearing skins, eating half-raw meat, practicing magic and providing furs to Norwegian kings (Vaughan 1987:328).

The written sources were undoubtedly important, but artifacts and living testimony were equally significant. Apart from trading, the “arctic goods” were either circulated among European rulers in the form of gifts or displayed in public (Ibid.). The earliest known instance of captive polar bears being from Iceland to

northern Europe is known to have been in 880 CE. Such “goods” started flowing in to Europe from Greenland around the 11th century (Oleson 1950). In this nascent trade, Norway played an important role as middleman between Icelandic and Greenlandic vendors and the consumers in European kingdoms. Polar bears were the most prized possessions of medieval monarchs while their pelts were considered valuable possessions by the Catholic Church. In 1432, a polar bear skin was admired by Venetian traveler, Pietro Querini, in Trondheim’s Nidaros Cathedral (Vaughan 1987:329). Other valuable Arctic relicts were musk-ox heads, reindeer antlers, walrus tusks, and “unicorn horns” (in reality, narwhal tusks). Oleson (1950) notes, with irony, that in medieval times polar bears were much more important than in the modern world.

Furthermore, research points out that the Arctic relicts were practical instruments of diplomacy. Around 880 CE the traveller, Ingimundr the Old, presented two polar bear cubs to king Harold the Fairhaired of Norway, who rewarded him with a sea-going vessel (Ibid. 48). Secondly, possession and circulation of Arctic goods resulted in the spread of valuable geographical knowledge about the North.

The late Middle Ages were marked by the Kalmar Union (1397-1523) – the union between Scandinavian nations. In this period Norway lost its independence, which would not be regained for several centuries. After the kingdom eventually split, Denmark-Norway appeared on the European map until 1814 when, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Norway was forced to enter into a union with Sweden until 1905.

The nineteenth century – the “period of unions,” according to Bravo and Sörlin (2002) – resulted in dominating positions of Sweden and Denmark in Arctic exploration and research in the 18th and 19th centuries, even though these activities were concentrated on the northern coast of the Scandinavian Peninsula and Greenland. Moreover, the authors point out the present-day “Arctic

claustrophobia” of Sweden, Denmark and Norway which “emphasize their investigations separately” (Ibid. 7).

Nevertheless, Norwegian culture did not lose its connection with northern nature while occupied by Denmark and Sweden. The Norwegian poet, Petter Dass (1647-1707) wrote the famous lyric poem, *Norlands Trompet*, which gives bright descriptions of Nordland and Sami people’s life. The images of nature that he created correspond with the national idealization of idyllic peasant life.

The absence of sovereignty did not ruin Norwegian national identity and northern pride. The Norwegian Lutheran missionary, Hans Egede (1686-1758), made a trip to Greenland in order to search for evidence of the Viking’s settlements there. In 1729 he published a book, *Det gamle Grønlands nye Perlustration* (“Old Greenland’s New Perlustration”), which described Scandinavian colonies in Greenland. Thus, the cleric from Norway founded Nuuk – the present capital of Greenland – on the land where his barbarian Norse predecessors founded their first settlement several centuries before.

A few decades before regaining its independence in 1905, Norway became one of the main players in the “polar rush” at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The main Norwegian contribution was made by the polar explorer, Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930). Nansen’s first major achievement was crossing the Greenland ice sheet on skis in 1888, and later, he nearly reached the North Pole (up to 86°14’ north) during his 1893–1896 expedition. Another Norwegian polar explorer, Roald Amundsen (1872-1928), led the first successful navigation of the Northwest Passage in 1903. In a competition to reach the North Pole, Amundsen was outrun by Nansen, but he did not despair and in 1911 turned southwards to Antarctica and reached the South Pole. Otto Sverdrup (1854-1930) is a Norwegian explorer famous for his participation in the majority of Norwegian expeditions, as well several others organized by the Soviet Union.

This period was characterized by the flowering of exploration and adventure narratives. The typical trait of this time, according to Eglinger (2010), is that scientific progress was the milestone of the polar scientific and nationalistic explorations, whereas before the end of the nineteenth century the main driver was economic. Eglinger points out that the real motivations of the polar explorations were competition for conquest and “hunts for the record” (Ibid.). This narrative reveals explorers’ dreams, in which the discovery is equated with “taking the possession”, and “the documentation of achievements becomes the actual achievement” (Ibid.).

The dreams of Norwegian Arctic heroes were accessible to the readers of many countries, since all of them had written and published books about their adventures. Their “documented achievements” were translated into different languages and supplemented a popular genre of adventure narratives.

Nansen’s book, *The First Crossing of Greenland* (1890), became a national bestseller – remarkably, the same year Knut Hamsun became Nobel Prize winner in literature for his novel *Hunger* (1890). Nevertheless, “while *Hunger* was printed in 2000 copies, but only sold a couple of hundred, *First Crossing of Greenland* sold 6621 copies in Norway in the autumn of 1890” (Henning 2010:43). The style of Nansen’s writing was rather entertaining. He starts the description of his adventure referring to the first Viking colonists of Greenland and about traces they left for their descendants to find. According to Eglinger (2010:11), Nansen attempts “to ingrain and authorize the excellence of his nation with a tradition of dating back a long time”.

Beyond the significance for Nansen himself, the collective importance of his expedition on cross-country skis became evident through its “nationalization”. In the beginning of the book Nansen constructs the history of cross-country skiing with nationalistic undertones referring to the medieval source, *Speculum regale*

(1250). As Henning (2010:46) argues “on the one hand, no other nation could have done the same; on the other, the polar regions appear like the most national of the Norwegian sceneries”.

The Fram expedition (1893-1896), in contrast to the relative minimalism of the Greenland crossing, became a great symbol of technical innovation. The book based on the expedition, *Farthest North* (1897), combines a scientific report and Nansen’s personal account. His emotional passages create a strongly subjective narration that contributes to the creation of the special myth about “the lonesome traveler, a heroic explorer and survivor” (Karlsen 2008:203).

However, Fridtjof Nansen’s figure is controversial because of political factors. On the one hand, he was a vocal supporter of Norwegian independence and got a Nobel Peace Prize in 1922 for his work with the victims of famine after World War I. Nansen “used” his heroic worldwide past in order to create an image of Norway: as a country of a great stature. That is why, as Karlsen (2008:200) notes, “It was very important to define the nation in relation to Sweden, by, for instance, being first on the Poles”. On the other hand, he expressed sympathy for the Soviet Union, which was not forgiven by his contemporaries.

Although Nansen belonged to the pantheon of Western polar heroes, he was not a typical one. He was the favorite foreign polar hero of the Soviet public of the 1930s. Many of his books were translated into Russian and were very popular. Frank (2010:124) points out that in Soviet mass culture Nansen was described as a paternal type of leader, whereas the image of Amundsen is shown as egoistic, acting only for his own purposes. The allusion to Nansen’s “warm” personality was appealing to the Soviet reading audience.

After the age of polar exploration, the next Arctic sensation was the discovery of oil and gas fields in the North Sea. This was the beginning of Norwegian “petroholism”. Due to the oil Norway has become one of the richest countries in

the world. But a large area of the oil deposit is situated above the Arctic Circle, which puts its fragile ecosystems in danger. Such concern for the environment has resulted in a long-term public debate on “extraction versus protection”. After the publication of the report by the US Geological Survey in 2009 on projected oil reserves in the Arctic, Norway as well as Russia have become increasingly interested in resource potentials of the Arctic across national borders.

### 3.4 The Arctic of the Natives

Historically, nations conquered the discovered territories and established sovereignty over them according to the principle of international law, *Terra Nullius* (the land without inhabitants, see Greenberg 2009:1336). The rights of indigenous people were not taken into consideration, and the natural resources were used according to the needs of the occupants. Indigenous peoples’ knowledge and practices were not important to the newcomers. Some peoples were conquered by force and others integrated through cooperation.

According to legal historian Stuart Banner, “indigenous people had never been understood to possess the power to withstand a claim of sovereignty by Europeans or their descendants” (Banner S. as quoted in Ibid.1337). The Arctic people were not an exception. Their history has been highly integrated into global history. “No community or environment in the Arctic remained untouched and unchanged by the larger historical forces, ideologies, and economic engines that have shaped the international system as it evolved since the beginning of the European nation-state system” (Ibid. 1315). Thus, from the very beginning the North represented a theater stage for the international actors who claimed their rights of possession and exploitation. The leading roles were played by researchers and adventurers who pursued their own objectives while no



significant role has been devoted to indigenous people according to the official records of the colonizers:

*Consult any atlas and one will find the names of the great, courageous European explorers of Arctic lands and seas. These men undertook momentous journeys on behalf of nation, king, or queen, and triumphed over adversity or died miserably in a failed effort to escape a frozen prison of polar ice. However, even in the most detailed maps of the circumpolar North, it will be difficult to find the names of any man or woman born in the Arctic or Sub-arctic community, who grew up there and had made their home there throughout their lives. [...] Consult any atlas, and one will find the names of no Evenky, Sami, or Khanti shamans; no Komi or Dolgan reindeer people; no Inuit or Aleut fishermen; no Tlingit, Athabaskan, Dene, Dogrib or Grinch'in chiefs; nor a remembered hero of any other indigenous nation. (Ibid. 1339)*

The first contact of the civilized world with the “uncivilized” Arctic communities generally resulted in a negative picture of northern peoples. The cultural practices and values of indigenous people were far from being ideal in the eyes of the colonizers. Judging by the northern peoples’ traditions and rituals, Europeans underestimated their actual fortitude and resilience. Lack of understanding of their life in a constant struggle to survive in the inhospitable climes was linked to the colonizer’s poor knowledge about the Arctic landscape and nature.

According to Doubleday (1999:192), “prevailing over nature rather than adapting to it” is the dominant narrative of the Western civilization. This evidence can be traced in the historical backgrounds of the colonizing countries, literary works, and stories narrated by polar adventurers. Arctic indigenous people – living within Arctic nature – experience it as home. Thus, while the natives keep the link in perception between landscape and transformation of soul, colonizers’ perception of the landscape was limited by the need of adapting to it.

In order to understand the perception of the Arctic as home, Greenberg (2009:1328) suggests having a closer look at two factors: sovereignty/territoriality and sustainable resource use. The factor of sovereignty and territoriality includes the porous borders between the Arctic nations. It means that the absence of defined borders could allow one to exercise sovereignty domestically (inside the borders, defined by community) and in external relations (between the Arctic communities). The second factor includes the use of traditional knowledge while practicing natural resource sustainability: “maintaining small populations and subsistence-based societies; preserving animal, marine and plant populations; replenishing communal traditions closely related to cooperative economies; [...] spiritual practices [...] [and] nurturing close relationships with the souls of animals and other living beings...” (Ibid. 1329).

Both factors stipulate a deep and intimate interrelation with nature – something that has always been missing in the occupants’ attitude toward it. Newcomers brought new rules to the game, imposing them on the alien culture in order to create a dynamic of dependence that they could exploit. While northern peoples were obliged to pay the tributes in furs, Europeans awarded them with tobacco, alcohol and disease. Nowadays, Arctic governments develop programs for maintaining cultural identity, supporting local languages and traditional crafts of Northern communities. However, the consequences of the past continue to affect their way of life today.

The peoples of the Arctic treat it as ‘home’ and possess a very gentle attitude towards the environment in which they live. Despite the violence that is inherent in their land, Inuits preserve *nuannaarpoq* – the quality of “taking extravagant pleasure in being alive” (Lopez 1986:135). Inuktitut use the word *nunatsiaq* to describe their land, which means “the beautiful/shining land” (Doubleday 1999:190). The Northwest territory of Canada is named Nunavut, which means “our land” in Inuit (Greenberg 2009:1310).

Arctic indigenous peoples, like other cultures with an animated sense of nature, respect supernatural powers to which they believe they are subordinate (Shelagh 1997:193). Different spirits are concealed in nature and are usually represented as one of the main characters of oral and written narratives. The social practice and worldview of Shamanism amongst the aboriginal peoples of the Russian Arctic, moreover, serves as “a marker of ethnic identity and cultural survival” (Walker 2003:41).

The cultural legacy of Arctic peoples represents a rich and self-sustaining system – a relationship which is reflected in the narratives from across various cultural groups. The legends and stories from the North tell us about Arctic heroes and their interaction with nature and spirits. Despite the impressive variation of these narratives, some storylines and motifs are circulated and maintained across the whole Arctic space. For example, according to Kennedy (1997:218), the myth about the sea goddess, Sedna, in every variety of its contexts represents a pan-Arctic narrative “extending from Greenland across Canadian North to Siberia”.

The present day presents limited possibilities for Arctic peoples to influence the official debates about the future of their homeland. There is little evidence of their participation in the public debate either. Since 1991 the Arctic Council – the intergovernmental body dealing with northern issues – has aimed to regulate disputes between indigenous people and the Arctic coastal states. Its agenda is broad and urgent, especially now as the Arctic and the whole world are facing rapid climate change and its consequences. Yet, this organization has not yet proven to be a powerful actor on the global stage nor managed to take a stand against the dominating economic interests of outsiders.

### 3.5 The Outsiders' Arctic

*What we know of the Arctic now, even of the oral tradition, is largely filtered through the screen of literacy, so that the Arctic of scholars, adventurers and to some extent of the Inuit themselves, is a literary construct. Yet as we experience it through story, barriers crumble, boundaries blur; we can if we listen, hear ourselves breathe.*

*Moss (1997:2)*

Before going further it is important to have a closer look at the problem of understanding and perceiving the Arctic from the perspective of people who never lived there. In the study of the representations of the North in ancient thought, Romm points out that “despite continuing advances in science and exploration, the average citizens of Greece and Rome clung to the conceptions of the earth's edges that best suited their imaginative needs” (1992:41). At the same time, in the study of modern representations of the Canadian Arctic, linguist John Moss points out that “the Arctic is a condition of our imagination” (Moss 1997:5). From both perspectives, it is possible to conclude that imagination has played a crucial role in our perception of the Arctic across time. This statement is not true regarding the indigenous northern populations, and we will see why.

The patterns of understanding the Arctic are complex and ambiguous. The audience and participants of official and public debates on the region can generally be divided into two groups: the majority – who have never been to the North – and the minority – who have visited the North due to professional, scientific or touristic interests. Without giving preference to any group in particular, Moss portrays both types as outsiders (Moss 1994, 1999, Doubleday 1999).

If the outsider's mind approaches the image of the Arctic, it collides with three barriers: geographic borders, imagined landscape and understanding of Arctic nature.

First of all, geographic perception of the Arctic reveals its vague boundaries. When we talk about the Arctic we usually mean "the cultural notions surrounding this area as representing a generalized North" (Ryall et al. 2010:xii). In any of the Arctic narratives these borders are set by the author. According to Emmerson (2011), different fields of science have different views regarding what the Arctic is. For example, for political scientists the Arctic boundaries extend according to the ambitions of different states. From the perspective of discourse, "the geographical boundaries of the Arctic themselves are both set discursively and affected the formation of the discourses" (Ryall et al. 2010:xiii).

Secondly, the remoteness of the Arctic affects our representation of the landscape. For the majority it is problematic to visit the area and see it with one's own eyes. We will never experience the landscape as it is experienced by indigenous people. Moss points out that "the Arctic of outsiders is a landscape of the mind, shaped more by reading than by experience and perception" (1999:336). The general representation of the Arctic is based rather on textual or visual resources, using data we have absorbed from books, films, articles and other sources that reflect "the dreams of writers" (Ibid. 342). The officials create their rhetoric and make political decisions about a territory that they have never seen and make "legislation affecting land claims, ecology, and human welfare [...] enacted on the basis of an Arctic written into [the] imagination of legislators, whose own experience of the north is often limited to, and always shaped by, what others write of it" (Ibid. 341). In addition, Doubleday concludes that "while we perceive the Arctic as a horizon, not home, we become more remote from it" (1999:194). So, it is not the Arctic that is remote, but us who distance ourselves from it.

Thirdly, the majority of outsiders have contradictory feelings regarding Northern nature and populations. For some the Arctic is a lifeless and cold place, while for others it is in constant metamorphosis, churning with life in rich ecosystems. Yet still for others, both views are accepted. Probably, outsiders' attitudes to Arctic nature are purely discursive constructs, while people who live there experience it as home (Doubleday 1999). Lopez (1986) points out that people, in general, have lost any sense of affinity with nature. Whichever is the case will come to influence the construction of the public debate.

To sum up, Moss stresses that (1999:342) our story of the Arctic "... is shaped by the desire of the narrator..." Thus, a contemporary Arctic outsider cannot have a realistic understanding of the Arctic, since that understanding is always constructed. What is conceived in one's mind is a combination of images related to the narratives of the Arctic. Moreover, as a member of the public debate, the outsider "consumes" different ideas about the Arctic provided by various actors, such as national governments, oil companies or environmental organizations.

### 3.6 Cold vs. Warm Arctic

Myths about *Hyperborea* and *Ultima Thule* have contributed to the emergence of opposing ideas of a "cold vs. warm" Arctic (Frank 2010). This dichotomy, moreover, plays an important role in the present-day understanding and representation of the Arctic. Deriving from ancient cultural legacies, these "motives" have been developed through the centuries and appear nowadays as important narratives of the Arctic.

The myth about the Hyperborean region is akin to the concept of "utopia". The world of Hyperboreans served as a mirror for greedy Greeks to help them reflect on their immoral sides (Romm 1992). Briefly, Hyperboreans were superior beings

that lived blissfully in a warm and blooming land. Referring to the myth about Atlantis, Plato stresses that people who live in *oikoumene* (“known land”) are of the lower level than those who live beyond (Ibid. 125).

Many centuries after Plato’s musings, Friedrich Nietzsche referred to Hyperboreans in his work, *Antichrist*, in order to dispel the myths and prejudices of his contemporary society. Nietzsche transforms the narrative by focusing on Hyperboreans’ superhuman nature and their ability to exist in cold conditions. According to Nietzsche’s ideal representations, man should be placed in a cold environment, preferably the Arctic or the Alps, in order to become a “higher type of Man... who is longing for power and has freed himself of morality... to live in isolation from the ‘warm’ community...of Christians” (Frank 2010:107).

Further transformation of the narrative of the “warm Arctic” can be found during the “golden ages of the Soviet Arctic” (Youngs 2010) and in modern public debates, which will be discussed in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter.

The myth about the island of Thule has contributed to the idea of a “cold Arctic”. This image, according to Greenberg (2009:1310), represents “the awesome, icebound, resource-abundant northernmost boundary of classical and early modern European imagination and ambition.” The “cold Arctic” is that which is not easily subdued. However, the idea of “mastering” (in the Victorian sense) or “opening” the Arctic (in 21<sup>st</sup> century terms) has remained attractive up to the present-day due to the common expectation of garnering wealth from the region through extractive or exploitative means. As we have seen, Romans desired to attain “greatness” and “wealth” from Thule (Romm 1992), whereas, the history of the twentieth century showed that the conquest of the “cold Arctic” would give even more: fame, wealth, mastery, scientific data, resources and so on.

Returning to reflections about colonial discourse, many authors conclude that the dichotomy of “man vs. nature” refers to Western cultures (Chartier 2006, Ryall et

al. 2010, Doubleday 1999 ets). Oswald Spengler was the first modern philosopher that opposed and criticized occidental civilization (Frank 2010). In his view, the Arctic rush of Europeans was a symptom “...of the Western tradition of ‘Faustian culture’ which began with the renaissance and aimed at a global extension of its power” (Ibid. 110). As Doubleday (1999:192) observes, Europeans adhered to ideas of “prevailing over nature, rather than adapting to it”.

Frank (2010) argues that the same opposition was a common part of the Soviet Arctic discourse of the 1930s. Moreover, colonization of the Northern territories of Russia date back to the 12<sup>th</sup> century, while active Arctic exploration and scientific research started at the same time as Western ones. Russian experience can generally be referred to as a Western tradition, albeit with particular differences.

### 3.7 Conclusion: Arctic Narratives in Russian and Norwegian Public Debates

From global and national perspectives, Arctic history reveals a multitude of embedded narratives which inform modern Arctic discourses. And Arctic discourse is in turn a part of the broader discourse of the North. Representations of the Arctic – or the North more generally – from antiquity has undergone a certain transformation. The main peculiarity of these representations is that they have always tended to have a dual nature, particularly as a contradiction between rational and imaginative. The imaginative aspect was driven by the lack of knowledge about the North and curiosity of the unknown, and the rational, rather, by the expectation of gaining wealth, fame or status.

If we start from antiquity, the prevailing notion of the North, from the imaginative dimension, was “cold vs. warm” (Ultima Thule vs. Hyperborea,



respectively). The rational dimension was concerned with approaching the territory as prospectively rich, yet difficult to subdue (e.g. Ultima Thule).

Further down the line during the Middle Ages, the rational representation was in direct opposition to the imaginative one, which constituted the dichotomy “rich vs. mysterious”. Despite, people’s general ignorance of the Arctic geographically, the “fur rush” stimulated the northward advance of medieval traders and travelers. This led to formation of the first resource discourse enforced by the development of trade (e.g., Bjarmaland and Hanseatic trade). The mystery of the Northern lands and seas appealed to the ambitions of travelers, who tended to describe them with fantastical abandon (e.g. mermaids and dragons). The first traces of military discourse can also be found at this period. For instance, with focus on Siberian riches, the Russian state forced the military annexation of Siberia.

In the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the narratives of the “rich and mysterious Arctic” became the points of departure for intensive industrial development and scientific research. Thus, the resource discourse was further facilitated by demands for mineral resources. At the same time, scientific discourse started to “gain momentum”. These trends have not slowed down up until the present time.

20<sup>th</sup> century explorations and research contributed to the “denothernization” of the Arctic (see Chartier 2007), whittling away at the region’s mysterious allure. At the same time, it became more “explorable”, as expeditions from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> to the mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries attest. The increased militarization during the Cold War along with progressive industrialization led to enormous pollution of the North. The scientific evidence of the growing global-scale of contamination led to intense environmental discourses about the Arctic in the face of the climate change. Thus, this century is marked by the appearance of a new environmental type of Arctic discourse.

Historical narratives, thus, have shaped representations of the Arctic in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The present-day enforcement of the resource, security and environmental discourses around the Arctic has resulted in the combining and interrelation of several representations.

According to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (2013), if we consider the “Arctic” to be the nodal point of the discourse of the North, historical narratives produced the following Arctic dichotomous representations: cold—warm, rich—poor, and mysterious—explorable. These representations circulate in the discursive space as signs, which tend to fix the meaning of the nodal point. They can be seen as moments (with fixed meanings) or elements (signs with unfixed meanings). Among the representations mentioned above, only ‘cold’, ‘explorable’ and ‘poor’ serve as moments with fixed meanings. The rest of the signs are of a non-single-valued nature. This means that representations ‘rich’, ‘warm’, ‘mysterious’ are the elements which imply the Arctic-sign with diverse meanings depending on the discursive context. As Table 1 below illustrates:

Table 1: REPRESENTATIONS AS DISCURSIVE ‘ELEMENTS’ WITHIN THE ARCTIC DISCOURSE

<b>Representation (Index)</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
Rich (1)	diversity and amount of Arctic natural resources
Rich (2)	diverse Arctic ecosystem
Warm (1)	warming of the Arctic climate due to climate change
Warm (2)	1930s Soviet narratives of “normal living conditions in the Arctic” and social warmth
Mysterious (1)	Arctic environment represents a latent and diverse world, regulated internally, endangered by human interference
Mysterious (2)	belief in a land that contains real marvels (e.g. medieval representations)

I would like to give several examples of how these representations have constructed Arctic discourses:

- The Arctic as ‘cold, rich(1) and explorable’ constructed the old resource discourse with focus on the occupation of hostile Arctic territories, extraction of resources, and endeavor of scientific research;
- The Arctic as ‘warm(1), rich(1) and explorable’ constructs the new type of resource discourse. The easing of resource exploitation due to the climate warming and reliance on scientific research in terms of development of technologies for resource extraction and gaining the knowledge about the region with economic purposes;
- The Arctic as ‘cold, rich(1)/rich(2) and explorable/mysterious(2)’ construct scientific and adventure discourses;
- The Arctic as ‘warm(2), rich(2) and mysterious(1)’ constructs the environmental debate – the Arctic environment that is able to sustain a rich ecosystem, for which conditions were optimal until anthropogenic influence on climate;
- The Arctic as ‘rich(1) and explorable’ – the classical basis of militaristic discourse which emphasizes the need to protect the resources of the land without regard to its nature.

Russian and Norwegian historical and cultural traditions contain an inventory of Arctic narratives that shape national representations about the North. We can say that national narratives are the roots of the modern discourses in various struggles – resource, security and environmental.

The main storyline common for both Russian and Norwegian contexts, however, is nationalism. Bravo and Sörlin (2002:7) point out, “nationalism remains a

crucial narrative in modern Arctic history”. This narrative is actively used in both official and public debates in order to represent the significance of the Arctic as part of national pride and identity. The point of departure for all discussions in the Russian and Norwegian medias postulates that the state must be responsible for the Northern territories and their inhabitants.

Continuity is one of the main arguments of nationalism. According to Emmerson (2011:66), “... as Russia seeks to recreate a heroic self-image for itself in the twenty-first century, it is natural for it to return to the glorious successes of the Soviet Union, just as the Soviet Union appropriated the exploration successes of Imperial Russia”. In the Norwegian context, Nansen was the most significant figure, successor of the Viking’s explorations of the North and who established cross-country skiing as a part of national identity.

However, the mechanisms of power transferred through the national narratives work differently in Russian and Norwegian contexts. The modern Russian state puts enormous emphasis on the scientific achievements of the Soviet past. Thus, commemorating Soviet polar heroes, the stress is on how important it is to continue the tradition of the polar stations on the drifting ice floe (i.e. ‘Severnij Polus’, see on page 43) and scientific research in the Arctic. Norwegian officials claim a deep-rooted affiliation with northern nature, which is shared by the whole nation. Thus, the activities of Norwegian oil and gas companies in the North are nothing more than environmentally friendly acts contributing to both conservation of nature and national prosperity (see Jensen and Skredsmo 2010).

As I argue in following chapters, public debates in Russia and Norway draw on the imaginative dimension and revive the story of the warm Arctic in different ways. Thus, the Soviet legacy of a “warm Arctic” can be found in modern Russian public debate on the almost-utopian project that was presented at the International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk in 2011. According to the UMKA-

project, a space-station type high-tech city with a life-supporting system could be built on Kotelny Island beyond the Arctic Circle (Kommersant FM 2011). A huge area built-up with laboratories, schools and farms will be covered by a cupola in order to protect the citizens from the cold and regulate the climate from inside. Ideally, scientists and workers in the oil-gas industry would be provided with all necessary products and commodities (Vasiljeva and Drankina 2011).

Remarkably, the project's name, UMKA, represents a reference to a cultural narrative. *Umka* in the Chukchi language refers to a male polar bear. The narrative of a bear cub named Umka is also the title of a well-known cartoon (1969) from the Soviet period. According to the plot, little bear is very curious about newcomers – the Soviet scientists that arrived to establish the polar station. He tries to befriend them with a little husky puppy, who explains to him who the strange people are and that they are kind and not dangerous. In the end Umka gets into trouble. He disobeys his mother's warning and goes to explore the station in the middle of the night. Thus, he is caught by the inhabitants and taken by helicopter to the zoo. In the last scene, we see his happy face, waving his paw to his mother, saying: "Don't worry!" The message of Umka being sent to the zoo was meant to reassure young viewers about the cub's fate. From the perspective of mass culture, Soviet zoos "would save the threatened polar bears from extinction" (Frank 2010:110).

To sum up, the project of the utopian city in the Arctic aims to realize the targets missed in Soviet times, reconstructing the myth of the warm Arctic where people are able to live a normal life. The name of the city alludes to the successes of the scientific progress of Soviet Russia. If we read between the lines, the point of the UMKA-project is probably the claim that "even the polar bears will benefit".

Russian historical narratives support the old Soviet type of scientific and resource discourses in modern debates. The relation between humans and nature is defined

by the mastering of nature. Environmental concern plays only a supplemental role. The nationalistic image portrays the state which inherited a vast legacy of experience capable to satisfy the needs of every aspect of society, whether industry, the army, indigenous people, or local ecosystems.

Norway has significant scientific and resource interests in the North. However, Norwegian public debate expresses more controversial issues concerning the Arctic environment such as the activities of oil companies and climate change. The data reveals no direct reference to the key Norwegian figures and narratives of the past. But Fritjof Nansen's contributions can be found between the lines of some sources. Modern Norwegian narratives reflect an opposition between representations of the North as a resource and an area of environmental fragility.

**Summary:** The remote and mysterious territory on the northern edge of the world has provided full freedom for the imagination since antiquity. The impulses to explore the unknown were suppressed by the discourse of fear of the unknown. During the Medieval Age, this fear was enough to reduce curiosity by simply describing the North as a dangerous, empty, cold and lifeless place with hints of it being even place of demons. The prevailing ignorance of the Arctic in this period ended approximately in the second half of the nineteenth century with the boom of polar exploration. Demystification of the Arctic in the 20<sup>th</sup> century ('denothernization', see Chartier 2007) led to strengthening of scientific and resource discourses. Furthermore, industrialization and military confrontation in the region contributed to significant pollution in the region which enforces environmental debates and discourse of climate change.

## **4. Arctic Discourse in Russian and Norwegian Media**

This chapter aims to provide a comparative analysis of discourse on the Arctic in Russian and Norwegian media for the period of May 2013 to May 2014. As has been previously argued in Chapter 3, historically, key nodal points – resources, security and the environment – were a part of discourses of the Arctic in both countries. According to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse approach (2013), these nodal points form the basis of discourses which struggle for hegemony. As such, these discourses are examined within two debate dimensions, the official (i.e. governmental rhetoric) and public. Each dimension articulates its position with respect to the different discourses in the form of storylines, or a type of narrative which provides understanding of a discursive issue in a specific way (see Hajer 1995). According to Chapter 2, the concept of a storyline represents “a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena” (Hajer 1995:56). Hønneland (2004:41, Jensen and Hønneland 2011) argues that “people draw on such simplified representations of reality rather than complex systems of knowledge in creating a cognitive comprehension of a subject matter”. Moreover, this analysis draws on the classification of environmental discourses by Dryzek (2013).

Media is a stage where authorities and the public can express their perspectives regarding Arctic-related issues. As has been mentioned in the introduction, different political and media systems in Russia and Norway condition the relationship between the respective governments and public. The Norwegian tradition of corporatist democracy involves pluralism, freedom of speech and social responsibility, while the Russian one is based on hegemonic state rhetoric. Debate is the process of negotiating meaning within a discursive framework.

While the official debate has a prior position in the process of institutionalization, the public debate has the capacity of either supporting or opposing this process (Fairclough 1989). The present debate on the Arctic is a challenge for the opinion-makers in both Russia and Norway. The next section focuses on these opinion-makers and their positions, and elucidates why in the Russian media, the debate on the Arctic is framed in terms of a “battle”, while in Norway it is framed in terms of “cordial opposition”.

## 4.1 Opinion-Makers and the Issue Puzzle

In the previous chapter, I argue that pre-modern representations of the North have had an impact on modern Arctic discourse. Natural riches of the mythical northern island, *Ultima Thule* were the target of the Roman Empire’s exploration (Romm 1992). This created a narrative about a distant and cold land, uneasy to reach but valuable due to its resources. Therefore, it is possible to trace how this storyline re-emerged in the form of a representation of the Arctic as the region of resource abundance. Resource discourse is tightly intertwined with the issues of energy, petroleum and economy and represents one of the main discourses in a society’s struggle to “dominate” nature for its benefit. It aims at fixing the meaning of the Arctic as a “future energy province” (Jensen and Skredsmo 2010) – corresponding to the “dream” or aspirational representation of the region articulated by the Russian and Norwegian states and business stakeholders.

At the same time, the “opening” of the Arctic is becoming increasingly possible due to climate change, the warming of the environment, and the melting of the ice, actualizing the ancient myth about Hyperborean (see Chapter 3). Current representation of the ‘warm Arctic’ has two consequences. On the one hand, an ice-free and resource abundant Arctic enforces the debate in favor of extraction of non-renewable resources – an argument which supports the Russian and



Norwegian official positions. On the other hand, representation of the ‘warm Arctic’ – in terms of biological diversity and its rich ecosystem – influences an environmental debate which opposes the resource argument (Ryall et al. 2010). This representation is especially strong in the Norwegian media debate (discussed further herein).

Along with national interest in the region, ambitions of the Russian and Norwegian business sectors are high. Primarily, *Rosneft*, *Gazprom* and *Statoil* are the main stakeholders with interest in resource extraction activities in the Arctic. These companies face the difficult mission of drilling in the stormy, deep offshore waters. However, there are no safe technologies to implement in such a harsh environment. This study shows that the general rhetoric shared by state and business sectors in both countries claims the following: there is, possibly, enough knowledge about the north; new, advanced technology will be developed and successfully applied, avoiding risks to the region’s environment. This basic storyline draws on both countries’ long-term experience of “unique domestic” resource management. However, the official rhetoric of both countries differ in details, which will be discussed in further sections of this chapter.

The modern geopolitical debate rests on close connections to other polar states’ ambitions to divide the Arctic. The issue of national security emerges as geopolitical tensions flare during Arctic border re-establishment. This discourse is especially articulated in Russia, where the Arctic has been seen as an important, strategic territory since Cold War times. Thus, the media portrays the armed forces as seeking to protect national borders and securitizing access to the Arctic’s resources. The Norwegian approach to the security issue is much broader, including debate on “soft securities” (e.g. environmental, human, etc.) (see Jensen 2013b, Zysk 2013).

Environmental discourse represents the opposite side of the story, arguing strongly against any petroleum activity in the Arctic. Environmental stakeholders draw on different storylines in order to justify the mission to ‘save the Arctic’ from the oil giants. From the environmental point of view, the Arctic is represented as an area with vulnerable, but rich ecosystem. The following sections in this chapter show that modern Russian and Norwegian environmental discourses portray the climate change issue in different ways. Moreover, within the framework of Dryzek’s (2013) classification, the Promethean, administrative rationalism, sustainable development, ecological modernization, and green consciousness discourses are all reflected in Russian and Norwegian environmental contexts.

The previous list of environmental discourses – apart from the Promethean and administrative rationalism – are reflected in the rhetoric of the following opinion makers. The eco-oriented political parties support the position of ‘anti-petroleum activity in the region’ in both the official and public debates. Along with the green parties, international and domestic NGOs make their contribution to environmental discourse through public debate. This study shows that Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) are the most active participants of environmental debate both in Norway and Russia. Both organizations run programs for Arctic protection internationally. However, these organizations get considerably less space to express their opinion in the Russian media.

Nevertheless, the “interdiscursivity” (Fairclough 1989) of Arctic discourse is conditioned by other topic-related issues which are frequently taken up on international agendas via forums and conferences. The Arctic Council (AC) is the main intergovernmental actor providing a stage for governments to discuss and address a wide scope of Arctic-related problems and issues. One of the organization’s focus areas is the creation of a regional sustainable development

strategy. Scientific studies on climate change and environmental degradation claim the warming of the Arctic is reason for alarm, rather than for celebration. Thus, although melting sea ice means the opening up of the Northern Sea Route and access to the oil-rich continental shelves, the economic benefits should be seen as overshadowed by climate change, and it is this kind of complexity that the AC must maneuver. Aside from national actors, the body is also the main international stage where Arctic indigenous peoples are represented. However, the Council's important role in providing environmental vision for the Arctic was little mentioned in Russian and Norwegian media during the examined period. The main concern of the articles about the AC's ministerial meeting in Kiruna in May 2013 was primarily devoted to the prospect of including Asian countries in the AC with observer status.

The wide variety of stakeholders in the Arctic, from a diverse set of backgrounds fill the discursive space with different meanings reflecting their different aims and ambitions in the region. They focus on what each considers 'major issues' and seek to promote the hegemony of their position. In the next section, I will show how the Arctic discourse, with its multitude of stakeholders, is structured in Russian and Norwegian media.

## 4.2 Arctic Discourse in the Russian and Norwegian Medias

Analysis of Russian and Norwegian media sources from May 2013 to May 2014 reveals a huge number of issues circulating in the Arctic discursive space, some of which agree and others which oppose each other. However, the character of the Russian media debate implies a single-opinion power structure. It is very rare to hear two opinion-makers' voices engaged in a discussion in either Russian newspapers or on the radio. This is in sharp contrast to the Norwegian media

tradition, which usually presents a discussion between two or more opinion-makers with different backgrounds.

The frequency of media attention to resource, security and environmental issues prevails in comparison to other Arctic-related issues. According to Fairclough (as pointed out in Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:67), the configuration of topic-related discourses constructs interdependent networks, or the “order of discourses”. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the order of discourses is defined as “the sum of all genres and discourses which are in use within a specific social domain” (Ibid. 72). In each country authorities construct the order of Arctic discourse in the media, structuring it in a specific way. Societies either oppose or accept such order within the public debate. The role of power at the level of social institutions or at that of society has a “capacity to control orders of discourses” (Fairclough 1989:30). The structuring can be changed over time which is “determined by changing relationships of power at the level of the social institution or of the society” (Ibid.).

The resource and security discourses are the frontrunners of the Arctic debate in the Russian media reports examined. It is not by mere chance that the Arctic-related articles belong to the rubric, “Battle for Resources” (*Bitva za resursi*) in the Russian periodical, *Rossijskaya Gazeta*. The business newspaper, *Kommersant*, covers security along with economic issues, signaling their interdependency with regard to Russian ambitions in the Arctic. In addition, *Kommersant* dilutes the monotony of official rhetoric by representing positions of alternative expert opinions, such as economists, local politicians and scientists. The editorial board of the radio station *Ekho Moskvy* invited several independent experts during the study period. Literarily, they were allotted the task of answering the question: “Why does Russia, eventually, need the Arctic?”

The non-official opinion-makers of the Arctic debate in the Russian media provided a critique of Russian authorities' ambitious security and economic rhetoric. The official position's superlative – the mixture of 'vital interests' and 'existence of implicit threads' – can be clearly seen in the words of Russian deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin: "Russia is risking to lose its own sovereignty unless it protects its political and economic interests in the Arctic"<sup>13</sup> (Zubkov 2013). Unfortunately, the typical trait of the modern Russian media tradition is that critical opinions are not presented 'always and everywhere'. The typical trait of the modern Russian public is to 'turn a deaf ear' to problems, which are weakly related to their life. These traits, as well as the specifics of the Russian environmental debate and its complementary role in the order of the Arctic discourse will be further discussed later in this chapter.

The Norwegian media contributes to the resource and environmental discourses in order to be the frontrunners of the Arctic debate. Primarily, it reflects the Norwegian public's own split opinion regarding the dilemma of 'resource use or climate abuse.' In contrast to the Russian pattern, where resource and security issues supplement each other, the Norwegian pattern reveals the opposition of two poles, the state-business sector versus environmentalists. The issue of national security in the High North is an important one, but if compared to the Russian case, it appears to be rather weakly reflected in the media. This tendency is evident in the newspapers analyzed, the conservative *Aftenposten* and business-oriented *Dagens Næringsliv*. A significant amount of Arctic-related topics have been discussed on the nationally broadcast *NRK P2* radio station. The radio program, "Dagsnytt Atten", usually invites opinion-makers who previously brought up important topics in the print media. The popular-science perspective

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<sup>13</sup> Unless stated otherwise, all translations from sources in Russian and Norwegian in this study are mine.

created by the program “Ekko” on *NRK P2* is a significant source of ethical debate related to the Arctic.

The next sections are devoted to the analysis of the resource, security and environmental discourses in the official and public debates on the Arctic in Russia and Norway. The analysis includes the vision of the official and public storylines as articulated in Russian and Norwegian media.

### 4.3 Resource-Energy-Economy Discourse

The Russian and Norwegian economies are two extreme examples of a ‘paradox of plenty’. Comparing the present economic development of their oil and gas based economies and the level of democracy, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the curse has befallen the Russian case while a magic fairytale happened to Norway (Goins 2012). Both systems have been addicted to oil since the 1950s and 60s. Vladimir Putin emphasized several times that the country has no program for the transition from the oil economy (Morozov 2013). Moreover, the present political focus on innovations ideally corresponds to the oil industry’s intentions to develop innovative technologies for offshore drilling. Not least to mention, Norway got a new government this year but its political-economic course seems to be unchangeable in terms of reliance on resources. The present ambitions regarding the Arctic resource potential testify to the lack of intention in both countries to abandon their oil dependency.

This section focuses on resource and other economic aspects of opening of the Arctic. Russian and Norwegian official resource discourses are driven by interest in Arctic reserve stocks and follow the logic of the ‘pro-oil production discourse’ (Jensen 2007). Similarly, Johnston (2012:16) points out that Arctic offshore oil and gas extraction will enable both countries “to meet ongoing contractual sales

obligations” and particularly Russia will be able to provide Asian markets with gas and oil.

The official resource discourse storylines in Russian and Norwegian cases are based on ‘interest’ but different in terms of ‘expectations’. Russian practical interest in the Arctic’s potential is sustained by the expectation of the money flow due to extraction of offshore resource deposits and the opening of the Northern Sea Route. The brief version of this storyline states that “Russia’s national interest in the Arctic is fueled by expectations to improve the economic situation”. The Norwegian governments’ interest in the Arctic is fueled by the expectation of securing the stability of an oil-based economy. The abbreviated storyline of Norwegian official resource discourse runs: “Norway’s interest is based on the expectation of maintaining the fabulous wealth and welfare of Norway”.

Russian authorities’ expectation of ‘improvement’ and Norwegian authorities’ expectation of ‘maintenance’ reflect a fundamental difference in the official rhetoric. The policy document, *The Fundamentals of State Policy* (Russian Government 2009), postulates the “realization of the Russian Federation’s sovereignty and national interests in the Arctic...” The phrase ‘national interests’ is broadly referred in Russian media to justify an assertive approach for protection of the country’s ambitions in the Arctic. *The High North Strategy* (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006) similarly postulates that “Norwegian interests in the High North will be safeguarded primarily by strengthening our presence and increasing the level of activity in a number of policy areas at both national and international level” (Ibid. 7). The ambition of sustaining the Norwegian welfare state, however, is followed by more careful official rhetoric than compared with Russia’s. It draws on moderate assertiveness regarding the Arctic’s resource potential, since it is widely admitted on both

political and public levels that no one has yet estimated the precise potential of the Arctic's resource reserves.

Economic feasibility of Arctic oil and gas extraction is the main economic argument against industrial activities in the region. Nevertheless, Russian and Norwegian business communities are always able to introduce a range of statistics and facts speaking in their favor. According to the evaluation by the Russian Gas Community (*Rossijskoje gazovoje soobshество*), the estimated recoverable Russian Arctic resources amount to 106 billion tons of oil equivalent in 2014 (ITAR-TASS 2014). Previously, this sum amounted to 76 billion tons (Ibid.). Statoil, the Norwegian state oil company, follows a line of uncompromising rhetoric, stressing the absence of energy alternatives to fossil fuels. According to Statoil's *Energy Perspectives 2013*, by the year 2040, the demand for oil and gas will significantly increase, while the use of renewable energy will just increase from 1% to 8% (Statoil 2013:3).

Russian authorities have hastened to exploit Arctic resource reserves stressing both national interest and increasing interest in the region from other countries. A journalist, Prokhanov (2013), points out the possibility of military conflict in the Arctic: "it is the question of struggle... [the] philosophy of space [...] it is neither a struggle for [a continental] shelf, nor for walruses and seals, it is a struggle for the future theater of war...". The geopolitics of national and energy security is an important part of the official rhetoric, and it is interesting to note that official Russian resource discourse is followed step by step by the issue of security.

The Norwegian media devotes significant attention to the growing Arctic ambitions of other states, but the country is not in a hurry to start drilling in the Arctic, since certain areas in the north have already been attained in 2009 according to their application to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental



Shelf (CLCS) in 2006.<sup>14</sup> Currently, Statoil is considering to open new oil and gas fields on the icy edge of the Barents sea, an initiative which was heavily criticized by WWF in the Norwegian newspaper, *Dagens Næringsliv* (Langved and Endresen 2013:8). In the article, “Want to close a half of the Barents Sea” (*Vil stenge halve Barentshavet*), WWF’s representatives claim “Norway should not start petroleum production in areas covered with ice during the last 30 years. This territory corresponds to half the size of the Barents Sea” and represents a vulnerable ecosystem (Ibid.). Therefore, this example shows that Norwegian resource discourse is closely trailed by the issue of environmental conservation.

However, Statoil’s assertive rhetoric claims to have overcome all challenges and taken into account environmental risks due to past successful industrial experience and innovative technologies (Andersen 2013:29, Goins 2012). Debates in *Aftenposten* and *NRK P2* often refer to scientific perspectives which conclude very little is known about this region facing climate change, creating uncertainty and potential risks for eventual industrial activity (Dagsnytt Atten 2014, Sand 2013:6).

It is against this background that public debates respond to the state’s economic ambitions in a contrasting way in Russia and Norway. In 2010, Jensen and Skredsmo (2010) observed weak discursive mobilization regarding the Arctic issue in the Russian media. However, qualitative analysis reveals an approximately equal number of articles about the Arctic in Russian and Norwegian newspapers examined during the period of this study. This period corresponds to the last chance to report on fulfilment of the requirements of *The Fundamentals of State Policy* (Russian Government 2009), with the deadline in 2015. Concurrently, the Norwegian political agenda was occupied with the debate

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<sup>14</sup> According to their application to the UN CLCS in 2006, Norway claimed three separate areas in the northeast Atlantic and the Arctic: the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea, the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean and the Banana Hole in Norwegian and Greenland Sea (UN CLCS 2009).

on resource reserves in the Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja areas due to parliamentary elections held in October 2013.

Despite the frequent coverage of the Arctic in Russian media, the information is articulated predominantly from the official position with Vladimir Putin as a key opinion maker. From the readers' position, the Russian people are not really engaged in the debate and there are very few comments on the *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* homepage. However, the expert's voice – as an alternative source of public opinion – can be rarely found in independent media. Apart from the radio programs on *Ekho Moskvy*, the Arctic issue was actively discussed on the television channel, *Dozhd TV*, and on the websites, *Slon.ru* and *Livejournal.com*. These critical opinion sources are not followed by the majority due to censorship and the problem of access to the information. For example, *Dozhd TV* was disconnected by broadcasters since the Russian government found a pretext for accusing them of being unethical (see the “Leningrad scandal” in Davidoff 2014).

While the Russian government and businesses present the Arctic region as one of the highest national priorities for future development some expert opinions criticize this ambition arguing that the Arctic is portrayed as a symbol of welfare; the nation may never benefit from it. Thus, in an interview with “*Ekho Moskvy*,” professor Sergey Medvedev, accused by Vladimir Putin for being unpatriotic<sup>15</sup>, argues that national oil companies tend to exaggerate their business ambitions in the Arctic, seeking their own profit before the benefit of the nation:

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<sup>15</sup> Professor Medvedev, in a social network, gave his opinion that the Arctic should be placed under international control, similar to the Antarctic model. In October 2013 President Putin reacted sharply, accusing the professor in public for being a “meathead” (*pridurok*) and supporting an “anti-patriotic mood” (Kolesnikov 2013, Medvedev 2013).

*Rosneft and Gazprom do not so much tap oil reserves as disburse the state budget; [...] no ecology, no small nations, no fishermen can offset their lobbyism and influence on the Russian government. [...] Gazprom and Rosneft or Statoil and Shell need this state of affairs, as any time they announce proven reserves, their market value increases. It is all about capitalization of companies rather than about interests of the country. We may never see that oil. [...] It will go directly for export. (Medvedev 2013).*

Another example of expert opinion criticizing the general perception of the Arctic as a “future energy province” points to the fact that expectations for Arctic oil production are low. In an interview given to *Kommersant*, Valery Andrianov, head editor of the journal, *Russian Oil (Neft’ Rossii)* points out that:

*In spite of a quiet common perception among the general public, in the foreseeable future, the Arctic shelf will not play a significant role in Russian companies’ hydrocarbon production. According to RF’s [the Russian Federation’s] Energy Strategy up until 2035 the share of Arctic oil production will comprise no more than 5% or 10% of oil production. (Andrianov 2014:14)*

However, the public does not consist only of the experts. On the general level, the Russian public is little engaged in the resource debate. Therefore, it is difficult to define the resource debate’s storyline. The resource discourse is one for which the Russian public keeps a ‘voluntary or enforced silence’ regarding the issues at hand, or simply treats them with skepticism. The silence is ‘voluntary’ because no one really asks what people’s opinion is, except in seldom opinion polls. It is ‘enforced’ either because there are no conditions to express the opinion or no initiative to create such an opportunity. Public debate of the Arctic issue is generally weak, but this reflects the broader socio-political climate in Russia. People approve state policy and rely on official media – which leads to a lack of pluralistic democracy in Russia – but it is all fueled by the fear of criticizing the state. The pace of the development of civil society, thus, is quiet slow. Skepticism or indifference of at least part of the Russian public can be explained by their disappointment in Putin’s political course and its outcomes. However, as

mentioned above, this part of the critical public debate is constructed by experts and is rarely presented in the critical, investigative media.

Nevertheless, despite the difference in discursive mobilization of the Russian and Norwegian publics, statistics show that both societies are split in opinion regarding the problem. According to the results of the research by the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (*Fond Obsjestvennoje mnenije*) published in *Kommersant*, 45% of Russians think that Arctic resources should be extracted if they are there while 42% are against industrial operations in the Arctic because of the ecological consequences and want the resources “to be untouched” (Goryashko 2013:3)<sup>16</sup>. Thus, the opinion poll shows that Russians are aware of the Arctic’s economic potential (due to state rhetoric) and environmental consequences of the industrial activity. However, the same opinion poll shows that generally Russians are not preoccupied by either resource or environmental issues related to the Arctic. Thus, only 4% of Russian people associate the Arctic with “rich resource reserves,” 3% associate it with ecological problems and 1% with a recent “Greenpeace scandal” (this event is discussed further in this section) (Ibid.). The majority of respondents – 69% – associate the Arctic, simply, with “ice, snow and permafrost” (Ibid.).

The famous Russian writer and journalist, Dmitry Bykov (2013), in an interview with “Ekho Moskvyy” (reporter, Marina Koroleva), explains the attitude toward the Arctic from the position of the Russian majority:

*Marina Koroleva: Why do you believe that the policy Putin pursues toward the Arctic region will not find any support from most of the Russian people?*

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<sup>16</sup> This data is based on the telephone interview among one thousand respondents in Russia (Goryashko 2013:3).

*Dmitry Bykov: I do not think that at the moment the Russian people are seriously concerned about dominance. The issue of dominance is not as important for the Russian people; in the second wave of the crisis, the problem of survival has moved to the front burner.*

*Marina Koroleva: Think of the situation when a person gets a utility bill that is scarily high, but he or she knows that in the Arctic Region...*

*Dmitry Bykov: That the Russian troops are in the Arctic region...*

*Marina Koroleva: ...that the Arctic region and the North Pole belong to his country*

*Dmitry Bykov: It's nice to think about that...especially when the temperature in some apartments stays almost at the levels typical of the north pole area. In fact, the polar concept and the concept of global ice have always been popular in Russia, though I would not overestimate the population's anxiety for dominance. I think people are more interested in compassion, amicability, mutual understanding...*

*(Bykov 2013)*

In the above interview, the participants were discussing the 2013 Greenpeace activism incident in the Russian Arctic, which ended in scandal. As mentioned previously, the acceleration of Russian activity in the Arctic during this study reached its culmination in September 2013 when Greenpeace activists approached the Prirazlomnoje oil platform in the Pechora Sea. The activists were arrested and imprisoned for two months. However, this protest action did not protect the Arctic from drilling. In October 2013, Gazprom announced the extraction of the first barrels of Arctic oil from the platform. During this period of time, the Russian press was following the court process where the activists were accused of piracy. Later the indictment was softened and changed to hooliganism.

An opinion poll in October 2013 reflected negative attitudes toward the Greenpeace team from the majority of Russians polled. 42% of respondents

thought that this action was the result of a conspiracy by foreign intelligence services and governments aiming to deprive Russia of its own resources and sovereign rights (WCIOM 2013b). Among other answers, only 20% of the respondents believed that Greenpeace members were attempting to save Arctic nature (Ibid.). Ultimately, the statistics justified the influence of the official discourse and the relatively low level of compassion and amicability among Russians (which Dmitry Bykov mentions in the above interview).

Nevertheless, several Russian experts stressed the symbolical character of the oil extraction from Prirazlomnaya platform. In the words of Muratov (2013) it was a “political show-off” which enabled the government to claim to be the first to extract Arctic oil despite the difficult conditions. Another critique of Gazprom’s project on the Arctic concerned its profitability. The company accepted the huge environmental risk of a possible oil spill from Prirazlomnaya platform, even though the extraction of very expensive oil would last only a few years provide only low returns (see the critiques by Medvedev 2013, Muratov 2013, and Chuprov 2013 on *Ekho Moskvy*).

By contrast, from the resource discourse perspective, the Norwegian public debate reflects uncertainty about the choice between environmental values and the logic of the oil-based economy. Both aspects are strong arguments which raise ethical dilemmas and question whether the heroes of the “Norwegian fairy tale” can sacrifice their welfare at the cost of environmental destruction. The brief storyline, thus, reflects a challenge and contradiction to the public debate: *we are the citizens of a prosperous country and claim to be an environmentally responsible nation, however, it is hard to judge industrial activities in the Arctic which can both contribute to economy and bring harm to the vulnerable ecosystem*. The tools that the Norwegian public uses for active participation in this debate include not so much expert opinion as publication of comments and popular science articles (*kronikk*). Resource and environmental issues of the High

North discourse display a central challenge for both Norwegian authorities and the public.

As mentioned in previous sections, the transition from ‘red-green’ to ‘blue-blue’ politics in Norway was raising worries about the new coalition’s position regarding Arctic resources. Norway follows the European tendency towards right-wing policy, which is traditionally less preoccupied by environmental issues. During the election campaign, Nina Jensen (2013a:38), general secretary of *WWF*, criticized the former Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Ola Borten Moe, for using the renewable energy argument for the purpose of his political campaign. She points out in her article to *Dagens Næringsliv* that ministers are more “renewable” than the politics of a renewable energy future that they claim to support (Ibid.).

However, the decision-making process regarding the Lofoten case was postponed until the next Parliamentary term in 2017. Further, the media articulated the opinion that nothing would change regarding the oil-dependence of the economy: “We are going to have the economy based on oil and gas for several more decades” –a journalist in *Aftenposten* stated (Hagesæther 2013:9). It reflects the awareness of the public regarding expectations of Norwegian authorities to continue sustaining national welfare with the resource reserves of the North.

During the post-election period in Norway, the ‘fathers’ of High North politics, Jonas Gahr Støre and Espen Barth Eide, continued articulating support for the resource-based economy in the media: “We must manage the oil wealth with wisdom” (Støre and Eide 2013:4). The wisdom that they are talking about includes several aspects of technology’s role in the High North debate. According to Goins’ (2012) research, two aspects can be outlined regarding the unique Norwegian experience of dealing with resources. First of all, this wisdom has roots in the successful past experience which enables the technology optimists to

claim the ability to deal with the risks in a safe manner (Ibid. 95). Secondly, the environmental benefits of Norwegian technologies are not supposed to be underestimated, since “Norwegian innovation has made a global impact on developing safer and more environmentally friendly extraction technologies” (Ibid. 96). The use of the issue of the environment in the service of the resource discourse is stressed by Jensen (2007).<sup>17</sup>

Some months before September 2013 – the start of the campaign for parliamentary elections in Norway – public engagement increased in the debate surrounding the government’s initiative to extract natural resources in the sea areas around Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja islands. First of all, a nation-wide *Aftenposten* opinion poll showed that 41% of respondents viewed oil activity in these regions negatively, and 39% positively (Andersson 2013b). The relatively even split in public opinion on the Lofoten issue also reflected in Norwegian media sources. However, in contrast to the Russian case, this poll and the article published on it presented concrete opinions reflecting the public’s attitude and attention to the problem, including several perspectives from Lofoten residents themselves (Ibid.):

*Resident #1 (Kaja Sørensen): I think that it's most important to ensure the future for fishermen and their jobs. Besides, fish and whales can be scared away due to the seismic shooting that they [oil companies] are preoccupied with. (Ibid.)*

*Resident #2 (Ståle Ditlefsen): I doubt that those who are sitting in cafes in Oslo and drink their café lattes have ever seen what it looks like here along the coast line. We need new activities. Every winter there is a 'fish Klondike' but the business community needs several 'footholds'. (Ibid.)*

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<sup>17</sup> Jensen’s (2007) variant of storyline – “drill in order to save the environment” – is considered further in the section on “Environmental discourse” below.



The first example shows the position of the young local environmental activist, Kaja Sørensen, who supports an anti-oil production discourse. She draws on ethical considerations, viewing science and technology as potential disasters for the environment. The second example demonstrates the opinion of a local fisherman and worker in the oil industry, Ståle Ditlefsen, who speaks in favor of industrial activity in the region. The “new activities” he mentions refer to the oil companies which, in his opinion, will ensure business development in his home area. In general, the Lofoten debate represents a microcosm of the broader Arctic resource debate.

The rush for Arctic resources increases the rush for implementation of offshore drilling technologies which are still under development in many countries. It is remarkable how Norwegian anti-oil production adherents are engaged with the media’s rush to give a quick response to the issue. These efforts seek to expose illusions about Arctic resources, challenging the right of oil companies to use the world’s greenest technologies. The main counterarguments consider: 1) the lack of scientific knowledge; 2) the aggravation of climate change; 3) questionable profitability of oil activities in the region; and 4) development of alternative energy sources or a “shale revolution.”

For example, the argument about the lack of scientific knowledge was challenged by the Norwegian public in the following way: In October 2013, Joseph Mullin, leader of the project, Joint Industry Program (JIP) claimed to the newspaper, *Stavanger Aftenblad*: “Now the oil and gas industries possess technology for drilling in the Arctic region and have developed emergency response plans in case of an oil spill” (Lewis 2013b:24). In response, the authors of the article “Damaging Emissions in the Arctic” (*Utslipp i Arktis gjør mer skade*), Sand (2013:6), argues that not all research is taken into account by the oil companies. For example, the journalist showed that the inevitable emission of soot due to oil extraction would increase the speed of the climate warming.

The core of the technology discourse in both the Russian and Norwegian media depends on the argument of the advancement of innovations. The common point of departure of technological development draws a familiar parallel between the Arctic and space exploration. Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, qualifies the Arctic as “a hydrospace”, claiming that “to master the global ocean throughout its oceanic depth in technical terms is much more difficult than to fly into space or even reach other planets” (Rogozin 2014). Norwegian Statoil signed a cooperation agreement with NASA in the US in order to research how space technologies can contribute to oil prospecting and drilling in deep waters (Bertelsen and Ellingvåg 2013:28). Likewise, Statoil’s representative claims that the Arctic is the area of the Earth whose harsh conditions are the most reminiscent of space (Ibid.).

In Chapter 3 it was concluded that extensive polar explorations (in form of adventures or scientific research) contributed to the phenomena of “denorthernization” of the Arctic by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Chartier 2007). As a result of this process, the last ‘white spot’ on the global map was (seemingly) finally explored and subdued by human. However, the modern official debate both in Russia and Norway stress the need for a new wave of Arctic exploration in order to justify the excitement and importance placed on technological development and innovation in the industrial sphere.

The Norwegian ambition to provide high-speed Internet in the region is also related to space – infrastructurally speaking – since it would be impossible without a satellite system (Aftenposten 2013b:8). *Rossiyskaya gazeta* gave attention to Ola Anders Skauby, Statoil’s vice president of communication, who stressed that Internet access is one of the most important aspects of the region’s development and will lead to advances in scientific research (Zabrodin 2013). On the other hand, the dependence of Russian Arctic navigation on foreign satellite technologies is pointed by Mikhailov (2013).

The development of the Northern Sea Route in the foreseeable future will demand new technologies as well. Both the Russian and Norwegian media emphasize economic perspectives of this route as an important alternative to the Suez Canal. The potential cargo turnover of the canal amounts to 30 million tons per year (Borisov 2013). However, economic enthusiasm is not yet overshadowed by environmental worries because of the possible increase of vessel pollution in the region. This problem receives only modest concern in the Russian and Norwegian media (Endresen 2014a:24, Muratov 2013).

Ultimately, both Russian and Norwegian official resource debates, according to Dryzek (2013) belong to the Promethean discourse type. This discourse, moreover, rests on the belief that advanced technologies can overcome all problems, including the ecological crisis.

#### 4.4 Security Discourse on the Arctic

It is often discussed in the media that the opening up of the Arctic shelf will lead to a conflict of interests between the states which lay claim to the Arctic's resources. Russian and Norwegian official security discourses use this argument as the point of departure for their rhetoric. Classical geopolitical discourse reflects the interests and claims of Arctic polar states. Flint defines geopolitical conflict as a "struggle over the control of space, focuses upon power or the ability to achieve particular goals in the face of opposition or alternatives" (Flint 2012:39). The issue of national security is within the scope of this approach. However, the critique of this position is presented by Ó Tuathail et al. (2006) and can be found in Chapter 2. The critical geopolitical approach provides the possibility to extend the focus from national to environmental and human security.

On the level of practical geopolitics, the Russian official debate reveals the most conspiratorial security rhetoric. According to Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, “There is the possibility that Russian installations for oil and gas production can become targets of hidden sabotage by states-competitors” (Krivoshapko 2013). The storyline of this debate reflects the existing paranoia related to the possibility of losing control over natural resources in the Arctic. Furthermore, the geopolitical aspect of the official discourse is understood in terms of ‘historical necessity.’ In March 2013, Rogozin pointed out:

*The increased footprint in the Arctic region is crucial for the strengthening of the defense capability of the country. Since the 1950s the Arctic region has been seen by our potential enemies as one of the main targets, and today our northern borders are the most poorly protected. The project involves building a high-tech defense barrier not only under water, but also on the surface. The Foundation for Advanced Research Projects has already started working on the innovative system of illumination of the surface and air environment where breakthrough and leading-edge solutions will be implemented. (Rogozin 2014)*

The main message of official media concerns defense of national interests through an enhanced military presence in the Arctic region. Therefore, since Arctic resources are of primary national interest, resource security is a strategic priority for national security. According to the military priorities announced in *The Fundamentals of State Policy* (Russian Government 2009), the main targets of security policy include the creation of Russian Arctic military units and optimization of the regional monitoring system, including checkpoints on maritime borders. Other goals include the development of “early warning, prevention, and crisis management capabilities” (Zysk 2013:288). The creation of Russian Arctic military units was declared to already be formed by 2014 (Rossijskaya Gazeta 2013). Progress since 2009 has been slow in fulfilling these measures but results have been visible nonetheless since the end of 2013.

Hence, official media sources reveal significant advances in militarization of the region. The Russian Security Council announced its plans to establish a Joint Strategic Command (*Objedinennoje strategicheskoje komandovanije*) in the Russian Arctic (Mikhajlov 2014). On the 14<sup>th</sup> of March 2014, the newspapers announced the first landing of Russian troops in the region (Gavrilov 2014). According to Shamanov, the commander of the Airborne Troops, “With such bad weather conditions nobody in the world, except us, jumps with a parachute. Here we are, fortunately, keeping the leading position in the world” (Ibid.). At the Security Council meeting in April 2014, President Putin declared the creation of a base for next-generation surface ships and submarines (Rossijskaya Gazeta 2014).

The flurry of military activities in the Russian Arctic provoked even less response from the public in comparison to the previously examined resource issue. The border fortification plan included the reconstruction of the military base on Kotelny Island (part of the New Siberian Islands) with the aerodrome, “Temp,” which has not been functional during the last 20 years. Within the task of restoration of the military presence and supporting the air patrol of the Arctic several analogous bases are planned to be reconstructed in the future along the Russian Arctic coastline. This event was presented enthusiastically to the public through a variety of media outlets. In response, the public silence was broken by Alexander Golts (2013a:14, 2013b), a journalist who commented that these activities are unnecessary and strategically pointless. From his point of view, the actions of the Russian state have the same “symbolic effect” as a classic military build-up:

*However, this diplomatic game can go on as long as Russia does not appeal to arms: When it dares to use this threat, the collective defense of the NATO member-countries will be brought into play. Then, instead of advancing its interests and building tactical alliances with individual countries, Russia will have to stand up to the united front of the Western countries. In the meantime, Russia needs the wealth of the bottom of the Arctic Ocean and the advantages offered by the transit only to “sell” this wealth at a profit to the countries, toward which it flexes its military muscle. (...) Therefore, the Arctic Region can perfectly serve as a stage for playing cold-war games. I am afraid that it will be extremely cold for the military personnel of the airfield service detachment located on Kotelny Island. (Golts 2013a:14)*

How is this ‘parody on the Cold War’ perceived in Norwegian media? The Norwegian Ministry of Defense considers northern Norway to be “the Government’s most important strategic area” where priority is given “to support (...) international peace operations and conflict management, primarily under the auspices of the UN and NATO” (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2013). The brief storyline of this debate goes: *Norway does not lag behind other Arctic coastal states and is able to defend national interests in the High North, taking into account, of course, environmental and human security risks in the region.*

According to Jensen (2013b), Norwegian security discourse can be divided into two phases: 2000-2005 and 2005-2010. During the first period, the “echoes of the Cold War” played a significant role in framing national security discourse. On the other hand, attention to oil and gas resource reserves structures the Ministry of Defense’s focus significantly: “[O]ur strategic position is enhanced by the natural resources we manage. Oil and gas on the Norwegian continental shelf are of major strategic importance to other states” (as quoted in Jensen 2013b:86). During the second period, an evolution of the concept of security “... has led to more uncertainty in the shape of a fragmented, incoherent debate in which ‘everything’ is security” (Ibid. 92).

Analysis of data for May 2013 to May 2014 revealed the media's considerable disinterest in the military aspect of the North. Some articles focus on Russian, Canadian and Danish claims to the North Pole (Dragnes 2013:3). Other Norwegian articles report about increased military activity of its neighbor, Russia, in the Arctic. It is difficult to judge the level of Cold War rhetoric in the Norwegian media in the sample period of this study, but in general, yet there seems to be a neutral attitude. For example, the case of frequent flights of Russian military planes along the Norwegian border is considered ordinary: "Russians have a dual purpose: the pilots must exercise and Russia must show for both Norway and NATO that it is a superpower to be reckoned with" (Samuelsen 2014:18). In the Arctic, the Norwegian army is represented by the military unit, *Brigade Nord*, which is often criticized for being less effective than expected (Bentzrød 2013:3, Bentzrød et al. 2013:24).

Otherwise, since Norway does not have a "natural enemy" (Jensen 2013b), its rhetoric nowadays does not treat Russia as a potential threat in the High North. On the contrary, the Norwegian business community stresses the importance of commercial collaboration with Russia in the Arctic despite the recent Ukrainian crises:<sup>18</sup>

*Though there is a political ice-front between Norway and Russia after Ukraine and Crimea, the commercial cooperation is flourishing. Half-national Statoil cooperates with half-national Rosneft in the sphere of exploration agreements both on the Russian and on the Norwegian sides of the border. It is about possible billions [of kroner] from oil and gas extraction in the North. (Ask 2014:12)<sup>19</sup>.*

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<sup>18</sup> The crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 is characterized by a reincarnation of Cold War rhetoric in the media.

<sup>19</sup> This article (i.e. Ask 2014) was written at the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which focused on events in Crimea. Later stages of the crisis – sanctions as a result of the separatist war in Eastern Ukraine – has recently led to more serious implications for Russian-Norwegian business cooperation within the oil and gas sector.

Moreover, the main opponent of resource or energy security in the Norwegian case is the public, which criticizes environmentally risky offshore drilling in the High North. This position stresses the importance of environmental and human security issues with regard to the Arctic. The brief storyline claims to protect Arctic resources, not from the enemies from the outside world, but from the Norwegian population in general. With this in mind, the guardian of national security – the Norwegian Ministry of Defense – proved to be a successful mediator between the state and public interests in terms of taking into account a broad spectrum of security issues in their rhetoric:

*Current challenges in the North are qualitatively different, but not necessarily less demanding than those that faced us during the Cold War. Today's challenges are related to resource management, unresolved jurisdictional questions and the environment, all of which affect societal security. We cannot, however, disregard situations likely to entail challenges also entailing state security. (Ministry of Defence, 2008, as quoted in Jensen 2013b)*

Considering the question of environmental and human security in Russia, this study finds little attention to these aspects. Referring once again to Rogozin (2014), we see that he considers the ecological aspect as a pretext that can be used in terms of limiting Russian ambitions in the Arctic. Thus, currently, the environmental issue cannot be put at the top of Russian priorities because of the danger of being “squeezed” out of the Arctic:



*The environment is not the only factor that will set the highest safety requirements and standards Arctic explorers will have to stick to. As the experience of the past years shows, our immediate competitors in exploitation of the Arctic subsurface resources have almost an unlimited array of options, including military ones, to gain access to natural resources. We cannot disregard the probability that Russian exploitation sites can be turned into tools of hidden technical manipulation aimed, for example, to squeeze Russia out of the region on the pretext of its failure to meet environmental standards. The participants of the project think that the risk of interference can be prevented through building subsea base stations accommodating unmanned submarine vehicles, which will locate and fight off the threat. Such stations will be arranged in a chain of Arctic outposts, subsea “hornet nests”, which will be able to defend not only production fields, but also the entire Arctic borderline. (Rogozin 2014)*

In these circumstances, all concerns about environmental and human security in the Arctic recede into the background as insignificant. However, the issue of ecological security was the main focus of scientific conference on “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” (Salekhard, 25-26 September 2013). Mainly, discussions were devoted to climate change scenarios in the Arctic, the influence of industry on the life of indigenous Arctic peoples and ecosystems, elimination of the negative impacts of industrial activities, and the legal framework for environmental protection (Zavrazhin 2013). Unfortunately, the author of the article confined himself to general review of the conference agenda without giving more explicit details of the discussions.

## 4.5 Environmental Discourse: the Power of ‘No’

“The Arctic is not special in legal terms; it is just an ocean. The area is of course ecologically vulnerable. But it is possible to have responsible drilling”, declared the former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and one of the inventors of High North rhetoric, Espen Barth Eide (Seidler 2012). Similarly, the Russian

Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin (2014), was not short of ideas when claiming that “The Arctic – is a unique ecosystem which was formed in extreme natural climatic conditions, thus, we must penetrate it with great surgical caution”. In practice, both ways of talking about the Arctic represent the communication of the pragmatic power through the language of official stakeholders. As mentioned before, the Promethean discourse is characterized by indifference to nature and belief in technologies (Dryzek 2013).

In response to this pragmatic position, the Russian public is engaged in the environmental debate only partially, while the Norwegian public on the contrary is very actively engaged. Russian participants of the public debate draw mainly on compassion towards the unique, but fragile Arctic ecosystem. As Professor S. Medvedev (2013) points out in his interview to *Ekho Moskvy*, there is a need for a more ‘human approach’ to the Arctic since the government’s logic of ‘national interest’ does not consider Arctic nature and inhabitants on the institutional level.

Norwegian public participants of the debate use different rhetoric tools with different capacities in order to ruin the ‘oil illusion’ of authorities. Public rhetoric is sometimes moderately critical and sometimes full of accusatory statements. It is fueled by the understanding of the global consequences of climate change and rich in metaphors related to Arctic discourse. Based on analysis of Norwegian media sources in the sample period, this study proposes the selection of topic-related metaphors and expressions as expressed in the following brief but blunt summary, which could be entitled, “How the Norwegian public accuses the pro-oil adherents of ‘criminal madness’ (*kriminell galskap*)”:

The ‘Lottery country’ (*Lottolandet Norge*), Norway, continues its ‘carbon-party’ (*karbonfesten*), while maintaining the ‘Janus face’ (*Janusansiktet*) of environmental commitment, on the one hand, and the ‘banality of washing our hands of it’ (*ansvarsfraskrivendens banalitet*), on the other. Thus, Norway ‘inhales artificial life’ (*puster kunstig liv*) into the ‘Oil Age’ (*oljealderen*) in order to sustain its life in the ‘carbon bubble’

(*karbonboblen*). (sources: Endresen 2013:8, Melli 2013:4, Stanghelle 2013:2)

Such rhetoric could not appear out of nowhere. In fact, it is the direct outcome of the traditional appreciation of nature (i.e. Arne Næss philosophy of ‘Deep Ecology’) which is further reflected in the global environmental political agenda (see Brundtland Report, WCED 1987). The roots of the Norwegian commitment to environmental ethics and the idea of sustainable development are further examined in Chapter 5.

The global ecological crisis is approached more broadly within the Norwegian political agenda than the Russian one. *The Fundamentals of State Policy* (Russian Government 2009), for instance, mentions climate change as a challenge to global ecological stability, but the practical focus of this official document is devoted only to the stability of the Russian Arctic ecosystem. Norwegian acknowledgment of the ecological crises due to anthropogenic influence grasps all levels: local (Lofoten case), national (opening of new oilfields in the Barents Sea) and global (export of Norwegian oil contributes to higher CO<sub>2</sub> emissions outside the country). While Norwegian officials claim to act responsibly on each of the levels, the pro-environmental public claims that “responsible drilling,” in Jonas Gahr Støre’s words, is an absurdity. However, Norwegian officials have identified the scapegoat on whom to put the blame for unethical environmental behavior since the 1990s: the example of Russian environmental performance. This, furthermore, is used in the Norwegian media in order to justify the better Norwegian experience of environmental management (Jensen 2007).

The question of responsibility for the Arctic is shown from a different perspective by the Russian authorities. The blame is put on the irresponsible past of the Soviet environmental performance which is often reflected in the media. Reviewing the results of the international conference, “Prevention and Elimination of Emergency Situations in the Arctic” (*Problemi preduprezhdenija i*

*likvidatsii chrezvychajnykh situatsij v Arktike*) journalist, Andrey Evplanov (2013), points out:

*The cooperation of environmentalists is fueled by visible warming effects in the Arctic region and, consequently, by the shrinking of sea ice cover. Our country, however, has a specific national problem in the Arctic region and this problem is not caused by global warming. According to the data from Russian scientists, critical levels of environmental pollution were registered in a larger part of the Arctic area of the Russian Federation. The quality analysis showed that the surface water in the Arctic area of Russia is contaminated with petroleum products, phenol, heavy metal compounds, nitrogen and other contaminants, which are present in waste water coming from industrial and utility facilities. For many years the Arctic region has been supplied with everything required for its development and the support of human life, but hardly any waste has been removed from the Arctic area. (Evplanov 2013)*

The pollution of the Russian Arctic is the direct legacy of the Soviet era. According to different estimations, around four thousand fuel barrels were disposed of throughout the Arctic during Soviet military and scientific expansion. The barrels served as fuel supplies for vehicles in the empty, vast ice desert. Russian publicist, Dmitry Muratov (2013), points out that Arctic pollution is a direct but pervasive consequence of the romantic Soviet generation's desire to "leave their mark." The "barrel issue" – referring to the dumping of barrels filled with hazardous waste – was mentioned by Vladimir Putin as an inherited problem which the country is forced to deal with: "You think we threw them away? They have been there since Soviet times. And we are taking them away" (Kolesnikov 2013). Neglecting the issue of climate change as an outcome of global anthropogenic influence, Russian officials seek to shift responsibility to anthropogenic effects of the past, thus, offering the 'spring-cleaning' (*general'naya uborka*) of the Russian Arctic as the only and best way to overcome the ecological crises. Additionally, technological advances are expected to be developed and exploited in accordance with all environmental

standards. In other words, the official environmental storyline in the Russian case states that the “Arctic environment will not ‘suffer’ as badly as during the Soviet era.”

The official Norwegian position invokes the contrasting pro-environmental discourse in order to justify the story of “drilling to save the Arctic environment” (Jensen 2007). As previously mentioned, the picture of Russia as an “environmental laggard” has been circulating in Norwegian media since the 1990s (Ibid.). The recent efforts of cleaning the northern islands of solid waste left by Russians could not help to improve this image, since Norwegian opinion makers continue to use ‘Russia’ as a key nodal point in the pro- and anti-petroleum debate (Ibid.). Jensen (2007) points out the reverse effect of pro-environmental discourse according to which drilling in the Arctic by Norwegian companies will save the environment. It sounds paradoxical, but it works. According to this logic, Russians have already left their mark, so their further activities – without environmentally-safe technologies and enough experience – will make it even worse. That is why the prerogative of resource extraction in the Arctic should belong to Norway which is able to prevent the risks and conduct the drilling in the most responsible way.

On the other hand, according to Jensen (2007:250), environmental discourse is used to lobby against drilling in the Arctic in order to show an example of “good environmental management” to Russia. Moreover, by demonstrating the example of the ‘best’ environmental stewardship, Norway’s performance simultaneously contributes toward climate change mitigation.

However, there is ambivalence towards climate change in Russia. It is similar in part to Western environmental skeptics who argue against anthropogenic climate change and dismiss argumentation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). But the IPCC is never mentioned in the Russian media or by

officials. If a report in the media refers to the global scientific community in any way, it uses general phrases like, “foreign scientists claim/believe/etc...”

The environmental organizations, Greenpeace and WWF – and their positions in the environmental debate – are rarely referred to or examined in the Russian media either. After the September 2013 incident on the Prirazlomnaya oil platform, when a group of Greenpeace activists tried to put a banner on the platform’s wall but were captured, then imprisoned, the media was more preoccupied with the conditions in the Murmansk pre-trial detention center and the protestors’ court hearings. The main message of the activists – the environmental dangers of oil extraction in the Arctic – however, was not conveyed very extensively to the public.

With respect to global warming, it is difficult to say what Russian scientists tend to believe in. According to material from *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, scientists from the Russian Academy of Science (*Rossiyskaya Akademiya Nauk*, RAN) support the theory of the ‘cyclical’ rather than anthropogenic nature of climate change and claim that:

*...the warming in the Arctic region is a temporary phenomenon. It is caused by the **climatic cyclic recurrence**. (...) The cycles are regular; the rate of recurrence ranges from 11 to 60 years. Due to such a phenomenon, [some] ships are trapped in Black Sea ice, while [other] ships sail in ice-free water of the Kara Sea. The picture is totally confusing. (Bezmenov 2014)*

Another article from Norsky (2014) in *Rossiyskaya gazeta* quotes the words of Vladimir Katsov, director of Voeikov Main Geophysical Observatory, who emphasized the facilitation of access to Arctic resources due to climate change, adding his disbelief in its anthropogenic cause:

*I deal with monitoring of climatic changes, – the scientist said. – I can say with confidence: Global warming is a reality. The impact of the **anthropogenic factor** is a fact that is as certain as the fact that the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea.*<sup>20</sup> (Norsky 2014)

Some Russian scientists, however, tend to combine both arguments – the anthropogenic factor and climate cycles – in order to explain climate warming (see Vilfand et al. 2014, Golts 2013b). But they stress that human influence on the climate does not make a significant impact on these processes. In general, there is little attention given to the climate change problem in the Russian media since neither Russian authorities nor the scientific community ring the alarm. However, according to an opinion poll conducted in August 2013, Russians consider that climatic anomalies are the results of global warming (55%) rather than single incidents (35%) (WCIOM 2013a). Moreover, the percentage of those who believe in global warming in 2013 increased in comparison to the results in 2010 (Ibid.).

As previously mentioned, the Norwegian environmental public debate is intensive and uses strong rhetoric related to Norwegian environmental performance on different levels. There are several arguments used by the Norwegian public in the articulation of pro-environmental discourse and in order to expresses a strong ‘no’ to industrial activities in the Arctic.

The first argument comes from the critics of the Norwegian economic and political system which has been strongly dependent on non-renewable resources. In this respect, Norway is derogating other types of business sectors which, as a result, produce non-compatible goods for the world market. The adherents of this discourse draw on a ‘hypothetical’ situation – the depletion of the country’s oil

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<sup>20</sup> Here, Katsov alludes to the fact that the expression, “the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea” is a disputable one, since according to alternative interpretations, the Volga flows into the Kama River before flowing into the Caspian Sea. Norsky’s choice to emphasize this particular statement in the context of the article illustrates Katsov’s and the author’s skepticism of the alleged anthropogenic causes of climate change.

and gas reserves. If it comes true, other commercial enterprises would not be able to restore and sustain the Norwegian economy at the level of the present day (see De Rosa et al. 2013).

Secondly, Norwegian faith in the power of technology creates more frustration. Ole Mathismoen, environmentally concerned journalist from *Aftenposten*, criticizes the initiative to equip oil platforms with ‘green’ electricity from the mainland. (Mathismoen 2014:3). He claims that such electrification with the help of Norwegian renewable electricity will serve as ‘ecological decoration,’ whereas the facts show that emissions increase when Norwegian oil is burned outside the country (Ibid.). The question of whether cutting oil production is an effective precaution against CO<sub>2</sub> emissions was discussed several times in *Aftenposten* and on the radio *NRK P2*. On the one hand, it is believed that if Norway decreases oil production, it will increase in other countries (reflecting economic arguments of supply and demand). On the other hand, according to the above argument, there is no difference when the Norwegian oil industry produces less CO<sub>2</sub> compared to foreign oil companies, because the majority of petroleum is exported and, thus, burned outside the country (Aftenposten 2013a:4). There is no single opinion about the effectiveness of this measure.

Furthermore, there is critique of Norway’s environmental commitment. Norwegians are “unconcerned people” – according to the results of TNS Gallup’s annual climate survey (Andersson 2013a:14). The majority believes in the anthropogenic nature of climate change and supports environmental organizations more than the oil industry, but at the same time “deep down Norwegians are not scared” (Ibid.). Responsibility is assumed on both official and public levels but instead of taking precautions in reality, the majority relies on technologies with a ‘green’ label.



Ultimately, Russia and Norway reveal different patterns in their respective public environmental debates. The Norwegian public is more concerned with climate change impacts and the outcomes of melting ice in the Arctic, stressing Norway's responsibility as an oil nation. The Russian public, on the other hand, seems to accept the political course of conservation policy (*prirodookhrannaja politika*) in general, which is formalized in environmental policy documents. To the neglect of *global* warming, this conservation policy focuses on the *national* level and aims to improve the *local* (Russian Arctic) ecological situation to maintain ecosystem stability in the region. Judging by examples from opinion polls mentioned in this chapter, the number of Russians who believe in climate change is on the increase (WCIOM 2013a). However, since the media does not provide much attention to this issue, the public does not even address the question of responsibility for global warming.

Taking into consideration the wide variety of possible environmental arguments against the opening of the Arctic for resource extraction, the power of the Russian and Norwegian public debates have different “capacit[ies] to control orders of discourses” (Fairclough 1989:30). Simply stated, Russians say a weak ‘no’ to Rosneft and Gazprom’s activities in the Arctic, while Norwegians express strong ‘no’ to Statoil’s extraction activities in the Arctic. These patterns correspond to the orders of discourse proposed in the beginning of this chapter. Since the Russian official debate structures this order, placing environmental issues after resource and security issues, the public as of yet has little space to anticipate the official position and enforce environmental arguments against drilling in the region. The first explanation is the “controlled” nature of the media and limited freedom of speech (see the Introduction on the ‘neo-authoritarian’ media model). Secondly, with such a slow development of a democratic political tradition, society tends to leave the problem solving to the experts. Thirdly, after the collapse of the USSR, ecological scientists continued relying on the research

legacy of the Soviet era. When an ecological crisis was first put on the international agenda, the Soviet state was closed off from western influence. This is likely why Russian scientists prefer relying on the Soviet research legacy rather than on the Western one (cyclical nature vs. anthropogenic nature of climate change).

Referring to Dryzek's (2013) classification of environmental discourses, the Russian official debate follows Promethean discourse, while some elements of the "administrative rationalism" discourse can be traced with respect to Russian environmental perspectives on the Arctic. The latter discourse appeared in the 1960s and is defined "as the problem-solving discourse which emphasizes the role of the expert rather than the citizen or producer/consumer in social problem solving, and which stresses social relationships of hierarchy rather than equality or competition" (Ibid. 75). The hierarchical tradition of social order is prevalent in Russian history.<sup>21</sup> It results in the fact that "environmental problems are serious enough to warrant attention, but not serious enough to demand fundamental changes in the way society is organized" (Ibid. 89). In addition, Russian public policy is traditionally "accorded substantial status to scientific expertise harnessed by administrative structures" (Ibid.).

While Russian scientists do not ring the alarm for climate change, a number of scientific conferences devoted to the Arctic issue were conducted during period examined, several of which were mentioned in the Russian press. For example, the already-mentioned Third International Forum on the "Arctic – Territory of Dialogue" (Salekhard, 25-26 September 2013) was organized by the Russian Geographical Society (Zavrzhin 2013). The current president of the organization is Sergey Shoygu, also known for his role as the Russian Minister of Emergency

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<sup>21</sup> By this I mean the traditional centralization of political power in the leader's hands and structuring of social order within "vertical hierarchy" (see Sakwa 2012).

Situations (1992-2012) and afterwards as the Minister of Defence (2012-present). The international conference on Preventing Emergencies in the Arctic was organized by the Russian Ministry of Emergencies in the city of Naryan-Mar on August 20<sup>th</sup>-22<sup>nd</sup>, 2013 (Evplanov 2013). The fact that a government administrative body was involved in Arctic problem-solving creates a certain trust that the Arctic region is ‘in good hands,’ eliminating the need to stimulate debate and create a critical response in the public sphere.

The Norwegian case has also demonstrated the possibility of combining several types of environmental discourses as classified by Dryzek (2013). From the global perspective, the commitment to the idea of sustainable development is reflected in the Norwegian media. However, Norway, the country that ‘lit the torch’ of sustainable development, nonetheless carries it with reluctance (Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000, Lafferty et al. 2007). The Norwegian media’s reference to the concept of sustainable development in the Arctic, for instance, is quite low. For example, *Aftenposten* published only 5 articles combining the words ‘Arctic’ and ‘sustainable development’ in the period examined.<sup>22</sup> The argument in favor of sustainability is used in the critique of the resource-oriented economy, which, according to the opinion of the majority of its adherents, affects future generations, aggravates climate change, and destabilizes the ecosystem.

The Arctic environmental issue is referred to within the ‘weak sustainable development’ (WSD) framework in the Norwegian media. Major emphasis is given to the fact that the wellbeing of future generations is dependent on decisions and actions taken today. As mentioned in the introduction, there are two approaches to understanding this concept: weak and strong sustainable development, (WSD and SSD, respectively) (Nilsen 2010). Nilsen points out that officially, both approaches have been used within the official climate change

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<sup>22</sup> As checked through the media archive, *Retriever*.

discourse in Norway. Nevertheless, “in practice [...] Norwegian policy is predominantly WSD, a fact which is demonstrated through the continuous rise in greenhouse gases and the reliance on the non-satisfactory international regime of the Kyoto Protocol” (Ibid. 496).

An important finding of this study is that the Norwegian public often argues in favor of the transition to a renewable-energy based economy. This argument, according to Dryzek (2013), belongs to the discourse of ecological modernization, which has a family resemblance to sustainable development discourse. The former discourse draws on political commitment and retooling of industrial and agricultural sectors with “environmentally sensible but profitable lines”. Public support is crucial for this, since it “must identify with new technologies such as renewable[s]” and the business sector “must have incentive to embrace rather than resist ecological modernization, provided only that business is sufficiently far-sighted, rather than interested only in quick profits” (Ibid. 170). This approach is more practical but less preoccupied with eco-philosophical questions of relations between humans and nature, and is more applicable on the regional and national level. The Norwegian public likely sees more potential for maintaining a living in a ‘fairytale’ by implying this approach as the first priority and as the reason to come off of oil dependency.<sup>23</sup>

In the Introduction, I point out that Norway is characterized by the ‘corporatist’ media model (see Hallin and Mancini 2004) due to its specific political tradition (i.e. welfare state democracy). As discussed in this chapter, the public sphere does not expect the policy making of the new ‘blue-blue’ government to introduce significant changes in the economy. Currently, the new government tends to support the resource-based economy according to the corporatist

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<sup>23</sup> Examples of such argumentation can be found in the following sources: Endresen 2013:8, Sand 2013:6, Mathismoen 2013:23, Jensen 2013a:38.

governing tradition. As Lafferty et al. (2007:186) point out, “the priority of welfare built upon oil and gas revenues is treated by the officials as given and inherent[ly] good since the discovery of oil in the Barents Sea”. Moreover, Dryzek et al. (2003, mentioned in Dryzek 2013:239) point out that the Norwegian case of the corporatist government is characterized by “depletion of the public sphere, as former activists are attached into government, and accept moderation as the price to be paid”.

Judging by the Norwegian public debate reflected in the media from May 2013 to May 2014, this study concludes that there is more potential for “social movements and [an] oppositional public to push the country further” (Ibid.). This means that the present discursive mobilization in Norway allows for efficient public containment of the government’s potential political moves, including such maverick prospecting as in the case of Arctic resource exploitation and extraction. Strong public opposition to the opening of Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja for oil extraction is a case-in-point: the decision to start any petroleum related activity there was successfully postponed due to public engagement.

The Russian public sphere does not reveal such potential, yet. However, this study shows that the discursive mobilization of environmental concern has a potential to pick up steam. Russia is at the beginning of an “environmental awakening” (Lassi 2013). The main barriers to a strong environmental public debate in the Russian media are represented by social-economic problems along with the political system, which conditions the neo-authoritarian media system (see the Introduction; also in Becker 2004). In order to introduce substantial support for the protection of the Arctic ecosystem, the Russian public does not have to address the discourse of climate change, as it has in Norway, but should overcome the barriers of domestic policy and the lack of will to defend the Arctic ecosystem’s ecological stability.

The prospect of sustainable development does not seem promising in the case of the Norwegian public debate on the environmental, whereas it is totally absent in the Russian one. The introduction part of this chapter suggests the presence of another type of environmental debate – the discourse of ‘green consciousnesses’. According to Dryzek (2013) this discourse concerns ethics. The ethical component of the Russian and Norwegian environmental debates will be considered in the next chapter.

**Summary:** The order of Arctic discourse is structured by three main discourses – resource, security and environment. From the official debate perspective, the core of the Arctic discourse in the Russian case represents the collaboration between resource and security discourses. In the Norwegian case the core is represented by opposing resource and environmental discourses. The environmental debate on the Arctic is less significant in the Russian case, and there is little commitment to climate change discourse and ecological problems are considered predominantly from the local and national perspective. Norway is more committed to the climate change issue and often refers to the interdependence between climate change and the Arctic. The Norwegian debate, furthermore, extends the issue of security from a narrow ‘national’ perspective to a broader perspective of environmental and human security in the Arctic.

## 5. Environmental Ethics in the Arctic Context in Russian and Norwegian Media

As mentioned in Chapter 3, people have historically explored the Arctic out of economic, adventure and scientific interests. The diplomatic principle of *Terra Nullius* gave right to the colonizers to expand sovereignty over lands without a sovereign and treat indigenous populations as subservient (Greenberg 2009). Native populations were compelled to adopt foreign rules and, partly, lifestyles, despite the fact that their lives had been bound to the Arctic landscape for centuries. The vast variety of Arctic resources—from natural to mineral—was the main driver of the outsider’s intrusion into the region. The so-called “Oil Age”<sup>24</sup> has significantly affected the world energy system, which the 2008 USGS report states is inextricably dependent upon Arctic resources<sup>25</sup>. Arctic reserves are considered vital to helping avoid the depletion of fossil resources at a global scale. Interestingly, long before the USGS report estimated Arctic “riches,” Terence Armstrong (1963,1967,1978), a famous researcher of the Soviet and Canadian Arctic, predicted that development of the region was an inevitable process. Furthermore, in 1978 he pointed out that “the northern incursion” raises an important question whether “such activity [is] in essence a plundering of local resources or amenities, carried out by distant authority for its own enrichment or protection, or is [a] reasonable use of that authority’s sovereign territory?” (Armstrong 1978:3).

People’s use of resources, either sustainable or not, is the aspect of the human-nature relationship which has often being characterized as “human prevailing

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<sup>24</sup> The energy era of the twentieth century based on oil and gas production is associated with the 'Oil Age', however, it dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century when the oil and gas industry 'was born' due to the 'discovery of Pennsylvania' in 1857 (Campbell 2013).

<sup>25</sup> In 2008 the USGS published a report that the Arctic region contains 13% of world’s oil and 30% of world’s gas in undiscovered reserves (Brigham 2013).

over nature” (Doubleday 1999:192). According to Chapter 3, the Arctic represents ‘home’ for the native population that develops a “sense of belonging” to the landscape (or a “sense of affinity”, according to Lopez 1986). Barry Lopez, the “nature writer,” as Dryzek (2013) calls him, points out that “the differing landscapes of the earth are hard to know individually. They are as difficult to engage in conversation as wild animals. The complex feelings of affinity and self-assurance one feels with one’s native place rarely develop again in another landscape” (Lopez, 1986:255). This rather emotional connection with the natural world is characteristic of indigenous peoples’ intimate relationship with nature, which becomes endangered when outsiders introduce their new lifestyles and change the landscape for commercial purposes. Moreover, the issue of peoples’ adaptation to the challenges related to climate change becomes crucial.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the ethical component of environmental public debate within Russian and Norwegian media sources as it pertains to the Arctic. This issue is worth exploring since it can help highlight the mainstream representation of the Arctic within these societies, and reflects the public commitment to the future of the Arctic ecosystem. Moreover, the main sources of environmental ethics (or, ‘ecological ethics’, see Curry 2011) will be presented in the context of both countries. Ethics is a set of moral principles that guide “how people... ought to live and act” (Curry 2011:28). As mentioned in the introduction, the public sphere is a main driver of environmental debate (Dryzek 2013, Lassi 2013). This environmental debate highlights questions about the value of the Arctic ecosystem and its protection from any type of human interference. Secondly, it concerns the issue of indigenous people and how to support their traditional way of life.

The definition of ‘environmental ethics’ is a disputable issue. The common way to define environmental ethics considers “how humans should live with each other and the environment” (Rozzi et al. 2012:233). This is an anthropocentric



type of morality that gives a perception that the non-human world possesses an 'instrumental value' (O'Neill et al. 2012:7). Clark (1999:103) refers to this approach as "an ecologically-backward 'stewardship' conception of humanity's relationship to nature."

Many authors reject this approach to explore the relationship between the human and non-human world. For example, Clark (1999) and Næss (1999) point out that the Dutch philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, made a significant contribution to the environmental philosophy back in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Spinoza's main argument postulated that "man has no privileged position in nature" (Lloyd 1999:73). However, some scholars do not agree with this position and argue that Spinoza's approach – 'nature-centered' type of environmental ethics – is still man-centered. For example, Lloyd (1999:74) argues, that Spinoza's approach is a combination of "...a strong rejection of anthropocentric perception with an equally strong affirmation of a man-centered morality"<sup>26</sup>. Further, Lloyd (1999:87) concludes that "Morality, on the Spinozistic approach, remains circumscribed by what is good for the human species. But it is good for human beings to perceive themselves as parts of wider systems, as parts of wholes; to perceive themselves as they really are."

Ultimately, Patrick Curry (2011:7) approaches the anthropocentric perspective on ethics by arguing that its core is related to vagueness and ambiguity of the word 'environment.' Instead, the author chooses to use the concept of 'ecological ethics,' which, in his view, corresponds to ecological understanding of nature "as an extraordinary complex and subtle web of organic and non-organic life" (Ibid. 8). However, this 'ecocentric' approach, according to the author, "is not intended to replace traditional human-centered ethics, which has a legitimate and important role in intra-human relationships. The point is to, rather, that adding

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<sup>26</sup> See the arguments against Lloyd's (1999) interpretation of Spinoza's ethics in Clark (1999) and Næss (1999).

something new will enable an ethical behavior that a more anthropocentric ethics cannot, on its own, accomplish” (Ibid. 7).

Ethics is a matter of values. O’Niell et al. (2012:7) point out that “nature has ‘intrinsic’ value, or value as an end in itself.” In other words, such values are inherent, meaning that “in order to exist, intrinsic value, while still inheriting in the person or thing concerned, also requires one or more valuers” (Curry 2011:52). The source of ethical values of nature in the context of Russia and Norway can be found in historical and cultural background or environmental movements of the countries. Environmental, or ecological, ethics as a part of environmental discourse can be addressed directly with references to the sources of ethics, or unconsciously, by being embedded in the values of the cultural sphere of the nation.

According to Dryzek’s (2013) classification, “green consciousness” and “green politics” are categories of environmental discourse of “green radicalism.” Overall, this discursive dimension possesses a significant ethical component and aims at changing “both the way people think and so behave on the one hand, and social institutions and collective decisions on the other” (Ibid. 185). The discourse of “green consciousness” is an umbrella term for a variety of ecological movements<sup>27</sup>.

The Norwegian philosopher, Arne Næss, founded the ecological movement of “deep ecology.” Næss (1973) argued that the ecological scientific community needs to shift the focus from solving solely pollution and resource depletion problems<sup>28</sup>. In his view, a deeper concern within environmental studies is to raise

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<sup>27</sup> According to Dryzek (2013), it includes: “deep ecology,” ecofeminism, bioregionalism, lifestyle greens, ecotheology.

<sup>28</sup> “Shallow” ecology movement, according to Næss (1973:99), draws on ecology as “a limited science which makes use of scientific method”

“ecological sensibility” (Dryzek 2013:187). Such an ecology movement would be based on “a philosophy of ecological harmony and equilibrium” (the concept of “ecosophy” in Næss 1973:99). Thus, “deep ecology” opposes the “anthropocentric arrogance” with the principle of biospherical egalitarianism, which claims “the equal right to live and to blossom” (Ibid. 96). In other words, biocentric equality implies that “no species, including the human specie, is regarded as more valuable or in any sense higher than any other species” (Dryzek 2013:188). Witoszek (1999:452) points out that Næss’s ecophilosophy reveals “intimate connection, not just with contemporary ideas of environmental future, but with the indigenous [Norwegian] nature tradition.” Næss’s “deep ecology’s” principles have been criticized (e.g. see Curry 2011:102). Nevertheless, Curry (2011:110) points out that “the ethical heart of Deep Ecology itself, so to speak, is in the right place, and in a world so saturated with anthropocentrism, justifying the domination and exploitation of nature, it continues to offer a lifeline to those seeking an ecocentric alternative.”

Moreover, Næss’s (1973, 1999) principle of ‘biocentric egalitarianism’ is not an occasional contribution to eco-philosophy and ethics. Witoszek (1999:452) points out this idea can be traced in Norwegian cultural and philosophical tradition. His eco-philosophy derives from “socio-ecological factors such as low population density, the salience of rural culture and indeed the very exuberance of nature itself” and the “ancient semiosphere” going back to the Nordic sagas (Ibid. 452). This philosophy has helped shape Norwegian environmentalism; as Witoszek (1999:452) points out, it “established a green canon (...) a set of standards and cognitive strategies which have been transmitted from generation to generation.” As well, it includes the transition of “an expanded version of values of the Norwegian rural Enlightenment to the rest of the globe” (Ibid. 456).

Though the influence of Arne Næss’s deep ecology on the public at large is debatable, the growing wealth due to oil and gas production has not diminished

the environmental consciousness of Norwegian society. First of all, Norway has made two significant contributions to the environmental agenda by introducing the concept of “sustainable development” (WCED 1987) and the “deep ecology” movement. Secondly, analysis of the environmental public debate in Norwegian media from the previous chapter has shown significant disquietude on the ecological situation in the High North. While presenting an “anti-oil production” position in *Aftenposten*, *DN* and *Dagensnytt Atten* (on the radio *NRK P2*) environmental proponents stress the issues of peoples’ irresponsible attitude to nature with the message, “we can’t treat the Arctic the way we do.” Interestingly, this rhetoric fails to refer to the ethical values traced in Norwegian culture (nature narratives), or Arne Næss’s ecophilosophy. Also, when pointing out the necessity of commitment to sustainable development, the Norwegian public criticizes its framing within the “weak sustainable development” discourse, which means “sustainable development where utility or consumption is non-declining over time” (Nilsen 2010:497).

Nevertheless, the country’s economic system is still directing the nation toward a practical economic approach to the North, emphasizing environmental safety of conventional oil extraction and insisting on the growing importance of Norwegian ‘green’ technologies. The logic of economic growth cultivates expectations of further enhancement of industrial activities in the region. These expectations are fueled by the economic success broadcast by media. For example, “Between 2000 and 2010 North Norway has experienced significant economic growth” (Endresen 2014b:18). As a result, as has been discussed in the Chapter 4, Norwegian public debate in the media often stresses the ‘schizophrenic’ essence of the present which reflects both the coexistence of oil dependency and environmental commitment (see Chapter 4, page 93).

Analysis of Norwegian ‘general audience’ newspapers (*Aftenposten* and *DN*) reveals evidence of how the utilitarian ethics seeks to overshadow traditional

ecological concern, which is embedded in Norwegian culture and was ‘preached’ by Arne Næss. Nilsen (2010:497) further points out that utilitarianism became “the prevailing type of ethics,” a framework within which economy is expected to be substituted by nature in order to achieve “the greatest total well-being of affected agents.” Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, the tendency of “marketization” has a strong effect on media (Midttun and Witoszek 2014). It means that commercialization processes and business lobbyism fuel utilitarian values, which dominate in the public opinion. Indeed, the media contribute to spreading the myth of the power and efficiency of Norwegian technologies and supports official resource discourse “drilling to save the Arctic environment” (Jensen 2007, also see discussion in chapter 4, page 96).

This being mentioned, during the examined period, the deeper concern on the aspect of environmental ethics regarding the Arctic region was discovered in the Norwegian radio program *Ekko* on *NRK P2*. Many discussions on this radio program covered issues of the Arctic population (e.g. Ekko 2014a,b,c,d). They related them first and foremost to the aspects of globalization and the question how modern technologies and increased industrial activities influence the traditional lifestyle of native peoples. For example, the access to the Internet in Greenland has affected the mentality of young people, who, according to the older generation of Inuits, worsened their skills to throw the harpoon during seal hunting (Ekko 2014d). The radio program draws the conclusion that, the habit among the youngsters to surf the Internet starts “competing” with the development of the traditional hunting skills (Ibid.). Moreover, the modern technology of GPS-navigation is brought by outsiders for local Arctic hunters to use and is considered to “facilitate” and make the hunting more secure in the tough climate conditions (Ekko 2014b). However, over centuries indigenous people went hunting relying on their traditional knowledge of the landscape and ground orienteering skills. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the first newcomers to the

Arctic land “awarded” the indigenous population with tobacco, alcohol and diseases, however, modern influences in terms of technologies affect their lifestyles and contribute to ‘disconnection’ from nature (Doubleday 1999, Lopez 1986).

The Russian ecophilosophical tradition derives from soviet environmental studies and is associated with the Russian academician, Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky, and his model of evolutionary change. According to his theory, evolution goes through the transformation from the “biosphere” (‘the living layer of the Earth’) stage to the “noosphere” (“sphere of reason”) (Oldfield and Shaw 2006). Oldfield and Shaw (2006) point out that, in general, “the noosphere concept has symbolic importance for certain sections of Russian society and is typically associated with imprecise notions of society-nature balance” (Ibid. 147). The transition towards the “noosphere” is conditioned by the increased degree of human impact on nature which gradually turns the “biosphere” into “a new geological phenomenon on our planet” (Rutkevich 2002:26).

Oldfield and Shaw (2006) argue that Vernadsky’s ideas have influenced the perception and integration of the Western sustainable development paradigm into Russian environmental program documents, namely, the Presidential decree of 1996<sup>29</sup>. This program outlines the stages of transition towards sustainability and compares its attainment “with the emergence of the noosphere” (Ibid. 146). Additionally, according to Oldfield and Shaw (2006) conflating Vernadsky’s “noosphere” with the idea of “sustainability” is mistaken. It implies that Russia’s transition to sustainable development should instead be conceptualized “as an example of a consciousness attempt of humankind to respond to the enormous moral dilemmas posed by the emergence of a “sphere of reason” and the

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<sup>29</sup> Presidential Decree (1996) concerned Russia’s transition to sustainable development paradigm.

corresponding ability of humankind to influence fundamentally the state of the biosphere” (Ibid. 152).

It can be argued that, originally, Russian eco-philosophical tradition framed in Vernadsky’s approach has been human-centered. Vernadsky’s “conceptualisation of humankind as a defining and principal component of the biosphere” can be criticized by the adherents of more egalitarian approach to environmental ethics (Ibid. 152). However, his approach involves going beyond the general attempts to estimate human impact on environment and tries to understand “the moral basis of our activities,” which are often uncoordinated in order to respond to “the general call for ‘balance’ in the relation between society and nature” (Ibid. 153).

Judging by the present state of Russian environmental politics and the environmental concerns of the majority of the Russian population, such understanding, in Vernadsky’s sense, failed to provide good environmental performance. According to Yablokov (2010:2), state policies follow the logic of “de-environmentalism,” according to which “environmental costs are deemed acceptable in the quest for economic gains.” As well, the author concludes, “that a significant change in mindset towards the environment is required in both the power structure and wider society in order to arrest the trend of environmental neglect in Russia” (Ibid.). Such political course would be seen as unacceptable in the Norwegian context, since even the official adherents of industrial activities in the Arctic claim to take into consideration the environmental costs.

This study has shown that environmental indifference or neglect on the part of the Norwegian media debate is related to the “utilitarian ethical framework” (Nilsen 2010). In the Russian case, this framework can be defined as a “resource-centered” type of morality, strongly connected to the past cultural traditions and present political course. Historically, the Norwegian economy was based on fish

and later on non-renewable resources (oil and gas). Several centuries of the history of the Russian state reveal an orientation towards a broader range of natural and mineral resources<sup>30</sup>. Siberian and Russian Arctic resource “riches” represent traditional source of wealth and an ‘object’ of national pride which is no exception for modern Russia. Additionally, the social differentiation of the modern Russian society cannot provide the ground for a dominating position of the utilitarian ethics among the majority. The majority does not have the standard of living, as in Norway, which would be worth desiring to sustain. On the contrary, the majority would rather share the authorities’ expectations to improve economic growth by means of exploiting resources.

Furthermore, the limited number of NGO’s and weak political performance of Russia’s “green” parties, in addition to the absence of a visible climate change policy, cannot stimulate the “environmental awakening” of the post-Soviet population (Charap 2010, Lassi 2013, Tysiachniouk 2010, Yablokov 2010). Lack of the environmental concern reflects the tendency of weak environmental public debate in Russian media. According to a critique by a Russian environmental activist, Evgenia Chirikova, “in Russia there is widespread propaganda supported by Mr. Putin and the media to say that stories about global warming are untrue and that people shouldn’t be concerned about it at all” (Chirikova 2012).

Within the examined Russian media, several articles and radio programs touched upon the topics regarding environmental ethics. The ethical aspects which were discussed in *Rossijskaya Gazeta* and *Kommersant* were related to support of the traditional lifestyle and improvement of collaboration between business and local population. Thus, in *Kommersant*, journalist Pljusnina (2013:18) points out that in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug the eternal question considers “how to maintain the traditional lifestyle of the Northern indigenous communities, but at

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<sup>30</sup> Read about the resource aspect of Russian Arctic history in Chapter 3.



the same time continue and increase extraction of gas.” Ultimately, the article presents indigenous people’s opinion, according to which their interests are not taken into account because of “failure of the federal initiatives” (Ibid.). The same topic, as discussed in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* (Tajursky 2014), is concerned with the influence of the big holding companies that affect arrangement of the indigenous people’s life. It concludes that when “big money” comes to the region, new lifestyles follow. As well, the article cites the opinion of the head of a local nomad camp, who says “It offends my ear to hear how parents abuse children when saying: if you will not study well, you will become reindeer-breeder as your grandparents” (Ibid.). Climate change, as a factor challenging indigenous people’s life is not discussed. The focus of the Russian media is devoted to the oil and gas companies, which have long-term experience in intervening their life, exercising this right basing on “resource-centered” morality.

**Summary:** Public debate in both Russia and Norway brings up some ethical aspects within the environmental context. This section argues that the main sources of environmental/ecological ethics can be found in historical and cultural backgrounds of Russia and Norway. The Norwegian environmental agenda draws on the discourse of “sustainable development” and “deep ecology” (Dryzek 2013). The source of the neglect of the Arctic issue in Norway is presented by the strength of utilitarian ethics (Nilsen 2010). Russian politics of “de-environmentalism” (Yablokov 2010) provides the official rhetoric of the “resource-centered morality” and creates the barriers for participation of the public sphere in the media debate. The public debate in the media during the examined period gave attention to indigenous people’s life: in the Norwegian case the influence of new technologies and new lifestyles were discussed; in the Russian case the relationship of the Arctic people with authorities and the business community was addressed. However, in both cases media debate does

not provide ethical suggestions about the intrinsic value of the Arctic ecosystem and how we, as the outsiders, ought to act in respect to Arctic people and nature.

## Conclusion

The focus of this study has been to examine the patterns of environmental public debate on the Arctic in Russian and Norwegian media over the period of May 2013 to May 2014 and discuss the influence of these debates on policy-making processes. The issue of resource use and development in the Arctic has been presented as an important media topic in both countries during the sample period. In a broad sense, Arctic media discourse addresses three main themes—resources, security, and environment.

Russia and Norway are the Arctic coastal states that have always stressed the significance of their northern territories in their culture and history, and that have pursued an active policy regarding the Arctic. Despite different political traditions, the economic systems of both countries are strongly dependent on non-renewable resources. The governments of both countries support the “Promethean” environmental discourse, according to Dryzek’s (2013) classification. As the analysis of the official resource media debates has shown, neither Russia nor Norway are seeking to abandon their oil extraction activities in the Arctic.

Global warming is expected to facilitate access to Arctic resource reserves, which has increased the economic interests in the region. This thesis argues that Russian ‘interest’ in these resource reserves is linked to expectations of an improved economic situation for the country, while the Norwegian government is interested in maintaining the continued development of the Norwegian economy. This state of affairs results in a policy environment that favors resource extraction in both countries. The pro-petroleum production political course supports the representation of the Arctic region as an ‘abundant resource province’. Moreover,

both countries claim to keep the environmental risks associated with their industrial activities under control.

Moreover, from the global environmental perspective the vision of the Arctic future implies doubting the possibility of risk-free petroleum activities conducted by any country in the world. It rests on the assumption that anthropogenic actions in different parts of the world—by people who have never seen and probably will never visit the Arctic region—contribute to the global pool of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, which have a direct effect on the Arctic ecosystem. This study reveals that within the public media, the discourse on climate change presents a basis for the argument against exploitation of the Arctic ecosystem in Norway. Within the Russian media, by contrast, the ecological issue is presented in the context of pollution resulting from the enhanced Soviet Arctic development and research program.

Furthermore, in Russia the Arctic is viewed as a region of strategic importance and is central to protection of national interests and an intense debate on security. The issue of sovereignty and northern border protection is a vital reason why Russians want to enhance the military presence in the Arctic, restoring military bases and aerodromes on the bases of the old Soviet ones. During the sample period, the Russian official debate mediated the paranoia about the vulnerability of the Arctic in terms of national security. Border security in the Norwegian North is also an important strategic priority of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. However, when the public stresses that environmental and public security need to be taken into account, the security institutions change their focus from the purely national to include environmental and human security aspects.

The ‘rush for the Arctic resources’ is not a new trend judging by the environmental history of the Arctic. The evolution of representations and narratives related to the Arctic embedded in world history exemplifies the

statement that “history repeats itself.” This study has shown how Arctic narratives survive through time and reveal new representations under the veil of the old ones. First of all, the representation of an ‘abundant resource but uneasy to subdue land’, derived from ancient mythology, was re-created during Medieval times and again in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. During the Roman Empire, society argued against the need to reach and discover the island on the Northern edge of the world, *Ultima Thule*, which could lead to peril rather than to enrichment. The main barrier was the unpredictable cold waters surrounding the island. Further, during the Medieval times the territory was seen to be inhabited by dangerous monsters, while concurrently attractive in terms of its natural riches. Nowadays, when we observe the phenomenon of “denothernization” (Chartier 2007) and development of technologies, it was difficult to predict that the Arctic would be so ‘explorable’ and its resources so technically ‘accessible’. However, global climate change represents the moral reason of the modern time — or, a new imaginative barrier — for the proponents of the resource-based economy.

Environmental issues appear within Russian and Norwegian media through official rhetoric but to a different end. Both countries’ governments find different ways to avoid this barrier in order to provide realization of their interests. The narrative of nationalism plays a significant role in both countries’ state rhetoric. As has been argued in this thesis, the North as a symbol of national pride and identity in both countries is conditioned by historical continuity, which repeats itself in the modern debate. Moreover, the narrative of a “warm Arctic” (Frank 2010) derives from the ancient Greek myth about *Hyperborea* and can still be found within modern Russian nationalistic discourse and modern Norwegian environmental discourse.

Specifically, Russian official rhetoric tends to refer to the “great polar past” of the Soviet Russia, thus, justifying the importance of the Russian Arctic. Russian North represents not just an object of national pride, but also the main source of

the country's prosperity. The Soviet heroes, either adventurers or polar researches, become 'the benchmark for others to follow.' Modern Arctic "heroes," traced in the articles of *Rossijskaya Gazeta* and *Kommersant*, plant the flag on the sea floor under the North Pole<sup>31</sup>, create an Arctic city project of a utopian type<sup>32</sup>, set a mission of exploring the Arctic Ocean, associating it with a "hydrospace" (Rogozin 2014), and undertake parachute jumping on the drifting ice (Gavrilov 2014). Moreover, authorities rolled out plans to restore the tradition of polar research stations on the drifting ice flow<sup>33</sup>. Thus, certain Soviet experiences of development of the Arctic were actually 'borrowed' by the current Putin administration. Arctic heroes of Putin's time—as mediated through Russian media—possess characteristics distinct from the Soviet prototypes: they overcome the severe Arctic climate without difficulties.

The Norwegian approach, in general, is more practical and closer to a representation associated with a "cold Arctic." The Roman Empire did not succeed in reaching the treasures of *Ultima Thule*, however, Norway accomplished this mission in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This period provided Norway with several symbols of "national pride," one of which was Fridtjof Nansen and his "realistic conquest of the cold," which took the form of the Fram Expedition to ski across Greenland. Furthermore, oil was discovered in the 1960s and since that time Norway has made significant progress in developing its offshore exploitation of this resource under harsh climatic conditions. However, the representation of the "warm Arctic" did not escape the Norwegian discourse of

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<sup>31</sup> The expedition led by A. Chilingarov in August 2011 involved a Russian team that planted the state flag at the geographical point of the North Pole.

<sup>32</sup> The project of the city UMKA was developed by Russian architects (Kommersant FM 2011, Vasiljeva and Drankina 2011)

<sup>33</sup> The first "drifting" station, "North Pole-1" (*Severnij Polus-1* or "SP-1") was established in 1937. The latest expeditions were conducted in 2011 ("SP-39") and in 2012 ("SP-40").

the High North and was used within environmental debate justifying the “richness and diversity” of the Arctic ecosystem which is endangered by oil companies and climate change.

The positioning of the environmental public debate within the broad Arctic discourse revealed different orders of Arctic discourse in Russian and Norwegian contexts (Fairclough 1989). This study argues that the order of the debate in Russia has followed the “resource - security - environment” logic, while in Norway, the focus has been on “resource - environment - security”. The first two topics of discourse in each of the orders represent the frontrunners of the discursive battle, whereas the third one plays an important complementary function. In addition, the frequency of discussions within the third issue is inferior to the media coverage of the first two issues. Thus, environmental discourse is framed differently within Russian and Norwegian media debates.

This study has revealed a high level of coverage of the Arctic topic in Russian and Norwegian media for the examined period. However, any serious public debate on the Arctic in the Russian media is almost nonexistent. The general reliance on the ‘official media,’ and little space to express skepticism regarding the political course, justifies the success of the “neo-authoritarian” media system that has been consolidated under Vladimir Putin’s administration. Not surprisingly, the dominant opinion is presented by the authorities—the Russian president and government. The figure of President Putin serves as a key role in discourse, since as has been pointed out in chapter 3, Russian Arctic development has always been associated with strong leader’s ambitions. Therefore, in the sample period, the Russian public debate’s style can be characterized as keeping ‘voluntary or enforced silence’ regarding the Arctic. However, the part of the critical public debate is constructed by experts and is rarely presented in the critical, investigative media.

Norwegian environmental public debate is focused on the persistent tension between pro- and anti-petroleum production in the Arctic. There are good conditions for the

open expression of the opinion: pluralism, freedom of speech and social responsibility. However, the thesis has shown the existence of the similar split in both Russian and Norwegian public opinion regarding the Arctic issue on the basis of opinion polls (Andersson 2013b and WCIOM 2013a). While such a split was reflected and discussed in Norwegian media<sup>34</sup>, the concrete opinions of the Russian population were never presented within discussions in Russian media.

Russian and Norwegian patterns of public environmental debate have shown different construction. The core component of the construction is the discourse of climate change. The Norwegian public takes the anthropological aspect of climate change seriously, while for the Russian public this discourse seems to be nonexistent. Some of Norway's most vocal critics place the blame on the governments which encourage the most environmentally hazardous industrial activities under the mask of "environmental responsibility." The Norwegian environmental debate stresses that petroleum production does not affect only the fragile Northern ecosystem but also contributes to aggravation of climate change on the global level. Russians are more preoccupied by the local and national levels and do not bring up the question of environmental responsibility on the global scale.

Therefore, the proposed alternatives to solve ecological crises in the Arctic region are different. Norwegians mention sustainable development as an alternative Arctic development, but the popularity of this idea seems to be overshadowed by the discourse of "ecological modernization" (Dryzek 2013). The urgent need to make a transition from oil and gas dependency in favor of renewable technologies has been often stressed by debate participants within Norwegian media. The tangible gap between the governmental promises and deeds provokes Norwegian proponents of environmental debate to argue in favor of enforcing the

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<sup>34</sup> See the article by Andersson (2013b) which presented the views of different Lofoten citizens in respect to the issue which, as has been argued, represents "miniature" of the Arctic issue.



development and practical implementation of “green energy” technologies. Moreover, this step might turn to be the first significant contribution on the way of achieving sustainability.

Claims about the absence of the climate change debate and the politics of “de-environmentalism” (Yablokov 2010) suppress the ecological concern of the general Russian public. The predominant majority of Russians are not aware of the concept of “sustainable development” as a global trend of environmental discourse. This fact, along with the passive engagement into the environmental debate, leads to the public behavior when the responsibility for solving environmental problems is shifting on the shoulders of the experts within the clear hierarchy of responsible state institutions. Moreover, the Russian government’s promise to “free” the North from the destructive footprint of the Soviet generation creates the illusion that the main culprits of the ecological problems are found and that authorities are controlling the problem.

The other focus of this study was devoted to Russian and Norwegian eco-philosophical traditions, which derive from historical-cultural legacy and could become the source of environmental ethics within media public debates. Therefore, this study has revealed a “human centric” eco-philosophical tradition in Russia developed by V.I. Vernadsky (concept of ‘noosphere’, see Oldfield and Shaw 2006), as well as the “ecocentered” Norwegian eco-philosophical tradition developed by Arne Næss (principle of “biocentric egalitarianism” see Næss 1973). However, the media platform in both countries seems to be filled by the economy-oriented type of environmental morality—a “utilitarian” type in the Norwegian case and “resource-centered morality” in Russia. In general, both ethical frameworks advocate for nature abuse and resource exploitation at the expense of Arctic ecosystem—the “home” for indigenous communities.

To sum up, the possible impact of the environmental public debate on the policies regarding the Arctic has different pointed to two different paths in Russia and Norway. During the sample period the great amount of public debate – facilitated in Norwegian media – in part due to the Norwegian identity based on the morally charged nature tradition, – led to postponement of the opening of Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja for oil extraction. Russian society is just at the beginning of “environmental awakening”. However, the absence of the discourse of climate change, does not prevent Russian environmental activists and environmentally-concerned people from mobilizing in all cases where local concerns for the ecosystem become raised by the situation on the ground.

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